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The First Amendment and Paid Initiative.
Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View
and a Proposal
By DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN* AND ROBERT M. STERN**
Yeah, I think that if you have enough money, you can get on the
ballot. Yeah, no question.1
I. Introduction
The world will little note nor long remember Meyer v. Grant.2 Yet,
even a minor decision of the United States Supreme Court has significant
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; A.B., Yale College, 1964;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1967.
** Codirector and General Counsel, California Commission on Campaign Financing;
B.A., Pomona College, 1966; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1969. The California Commission on
Campaign Financing is a non-profit, private organization.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors alone. An earlier version of
this Article was delivered at the conference entitled "From Gold Dust to Silicon Chips: The
California Constitution in Transition," held at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, in San Francisco, on March 2-3, 1989. On that occasion, we benefited from
thoughtful comments made by panelists Kelly Kimball and Professors Eugene Lee and Wil-
liam Lockhart. A revised version was presented on September 3, 1989, to the Direct Democ-
racy Study Group at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. On
that occasion we received helpful comments from Tom Cronin, David Magleby, John Shock-
ley, and Ed Still. In addition, Nancy Maveety offered constructive criticism. Susie Sugerman
and Jerrold Greenberg of the staff of the California Commission on Campaign Financing and
Jan Goldsmith of the UCLA Law Library provided invaluable assistance to us in the course of
our research. Professor Lowenstein gratefully acknowledges research assistance from the
UCLA Academic Senate and from thediscretionary fund administered by UCLA Law School
Dean Susan Prager.
We are especially grateful to Mike Arno and Kelly Kimball, respectively the owners of
the two major initiative petition circulating firms now active in California, and Joyce Koupal,
former codirector of the People's Lobby of California, for sharing with us their knowledge,
experience, and insights during the course of lengthy interviews. We also spoke with public
officials and others familiar with the initiative qualification process in several states. Many of
these people are named in the footnotes, and we appreciate the cooperation of all of them.
1. Interview with Mike Arno, at 8 (May 8, 1989). Mike Arno owns American Petition
Consultants, one of the two major firms now active in California circulating initiative petitions
for hire. Transcripts of the interviews with Mike Arno, Kelly Kimball, and Joyce Koupal are
on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.
2. 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
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consequences. In Meyer, which struck down a Colorado law banning the
use of paid circulators for the qualification of initiatives for the ballot,
these consequences included the apparent removal from consideration by
the states of a salutary and timely device for the reform of the initiative
process. This cost was incurred in the name of freedom of speech. It was
a bad bargain because, we shall argue, the First Amendment analysis in
Meyer was flawed. The Colorado statute did not prohibit any form of
speech, and the Court's decision privileged not communication, but the
access to the ballot of those with financial resources, to the detriment of
those without such resources.
Meyer's timing was nearly as bad as its conclusion. In November
1988, only five months after the decision was rendered, twenty-nine state-
wide measures appeared on the California ballot. The official pamphlet
sent to voters explaining the measures totaled a burdensome 159 pages.
Although the large number of propositions was not entirely attributable
to the initiative process, seventeen of the twenty-nine having been placed
on the ballot by the state legislature, the consequence was a downpour of
criticism of the process. Responsible leaders predicted voters would be
"totally confused"3 or "completely overwhelmed." 4
Aside from the total number of propositions, outrage was especially
expressed because the initiatives had been placed on the ballot by profes-
sional circulators, sometimes representing narrow interest groups, rather
than by the voluntary efforts of citizens. A Los Angeles Times correspon-
dent summed up the widespread sentiment in the following terms:
It is not just the number of initiatives nor their complexity that is
prompting concern. It is that the system seems to have slipped
away from the citizens it was invented to serve into the hands of
the very kind of wealthy special interests it was meant to contain.
Merely qualifying a measure for the ballot can cost as much as
$700,000 and consume more time than most citizen groups can
muster. Taking their place is a whole new industry of consultants,
professional petition circulators, pollsters and media gurus who
have been lured away from traditional campaigns by special inter-
ests willing to spend whatever it takes to promote or fend off these
measures.
[T]he cost of merely qualifying a measure for the statewide
ballot has priced out all but the wealthiest individuals and most
moderate-sized organizations.5
3. Wolinsky, Are Citizens Losing the Initiative?, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1988, § 1 at 1, col. 5
(quoting Carol Federighi, California president of the League of Women Voters).
4. Id. (quoting Judith Bell, spokesperson for the Consumers Union).
5.id.
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What undoubtedly helped crystallize popular resentment was that
five of the initiatives dealt, in inconsistent ways, with the highly complex
questions of insurance and tort reform. Three of these were placed on
the ballot by various elements of the insurance industry, one was placed
by the trial lawyers, and all resulted from efforts by professional circula-
tors. The result was a drastic impairment, at least temporarily, of popu-
lar faith in the initiative process. In the past, Californians have expressed
support for that process by wide majorities. 6 Yet, shortly before the 1988
general election, three-fourths of those interviewed in a Los Angeles
Times poll agreed that "the initiative process has gotten out of control."7
Aside from blaming the state legislature for not passing adequate laws,
these citizens blamed special interests that used the initiative process "to
get around the Legislature," and the process itself because it was "too
easy to qualify" a measure for the ballot.8 The prevailing discontent re-
ceived national attention. 9
The initiative's reputation in California was restored at least in part
by the election results, which were widely perceived as reflecting an im-
pressive degree of discernment and rationality on the part of the electo-
rate.'0 But concern over the qualification process, particularly the abuses
made possible by professional circulators, did not disappear. At year's
end, the State's leading newspaper editorialized that "[tlhe 1988 elections
made a mockery of the concept of the initiative petition as the people's
election tool in California. The need for reform is more glaring than
ever.... Anyone with enough money can get virtually anything onto the
ballot with the use of paid petition circulators."' "I
6. See, eg., D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1984) (citing 1979 Field Poll finding that 85% of Californians said
proposition elections were a good idea).
7. Skelton, The Times Poll: Nader's Proposal Is Sole Insurance Plan Favored, L. A.
Times, Oct. 26, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
8. Id.
9. See Schmitt, California Voters Take Law Into Own Hands With Ballot Initiatives, Wall
St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at Al, col. I. While this article may be criticized in some respects on
grounds of accuracy and balance, it reflects well the near hysteria that existed at the time
regarding abuse of the initiative process.
10. For example, only one of the five insurance initiatives passed, and it received by far
the least amount of campaign spending in its behalf. A measure to increase the excise tax on
cigarettes was approved in the face of massive spending by the tobacco industry against it. An
AIDS testing measure widely perceived as moderate passed, while a far more extreme proposal
was rejected.
Although we have provided some documentation in these notes for our assertions about
public 'reaction to the measures on the 1988 general election ballot, we rely as well on our
experience as residents of California during that period. Concern over the process was wide-
spread and unusually salient.
1 I. Cleaning Up the Ballot, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1988, § 2, at 4, col. 1.
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A natural legislative response to these events and to the public reac-
tion that ensued would have been to modify the initiative process to ease
efforts of citizen groups with genuine public support to place their pro-
posals on the ballot, while restricting or eliminating ballot access for
those with deep pockets but no genuine voter support. But this seemed
exactly the response that had been barred by the Supreme Court only a
few months before in Meyer v. Grant.
Because of its unfortunate consequences and its flawed reasoning,
we believe that before Meyer passes on to the obscurity that no doubt
awaits it, a passing critical glance is in order. In part, this Article is
written to fulfill that humble function.
We also have a more constructive purpose in mind. Inexcusable
though it is, Meyer is not, as some have assumed,12 irremediable. In Part
VI of this Article we propose a reform that is more cumbersome than
would be necessary without Meyer, but that is in some other respects
superior to the outright ban that Meyer precludes."3 To explain our pro-
posal and why it is constitutional, we must first consider Meyer and what
we consider to be its defects.
II. Meyer v. Grant and a Hypothetical
A. In the Lower Courts
Colorado, like approximately one-half of the states, permits its citi-
zens to initiate constitutional amendments and statutes by petition. To
qualify for the ballot, an initiative proposal must receive signatures of
registered electors equal to five percent of the total vote in the last elec-
tion for Secretary of State. 4 At the time the dispute in Meyer v. Grant
arose, 46,737 signatures were required.
The plaintiffs, 'several individuals and a corporation named
Coloradans for Free Enterprise, Inc., were proponents of a proposed con-
stitutional amendment to remove motor carriers from the jurisdiction of
the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. 5 After completing formal
prerequisites to circulating an initiative proposal, they brought suit in the
12. See T. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFEREN-
DUM, AND RECALL 242 (1989).
13. See infra notes 189-197 and accompanying text.
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105 (1988).
15. Their proposal would have added the following to the Colorado Constitution: "Effec-
tive January 1, 1985, no person, corporation, or other legally recognized business entity en-
gaged in the transportation of persons or property for compensation, shall be defined as public
utilities, nor shall they be regulated as such." So far as appears from the record of the litiga-
tion regarding this proposal, its infelicitous grammar presented no obstacle to its being added
to the Colorado Constitution.
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United States District Court for the District of Colorado, seeking an in-
junction to prevent the defendants, the Colorado Attorney General and
Secretary of State, from enforcing a criminal statute that prohibited the
use of paid circulators for qualifying an initiative proposal. 16
District Judge Moore ruled that the statute was constitutional. 7 He
found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the ban on paid circulators
"prevented [them] in any way from espousing their cause."' 8 "At best,"
he found, their "purposes would be enhanced if the corps of volunteers
could be augmented by a cadre of paid workers."19
Although the Colorado statute prohibited the plaintiffs from spend-
ing their money in a particular manner, Judge Moore regarded it as more
similar to the contribution limits that were upheld in Buckley v. Valeo20
than to the expenditure limits that were struck down in the same case.21
He reasoned that when the plaintiffs paid circulators, it would be the
circulators' ideas, not the plaintiffs', that would be communicated to po-
tential signers. Campaign expenditures receive greater constitutional
protection than campaign contributions because they are the direct
means of communicating the spender's ideas. Campaign contributions,
as Justice Marshall observed in a case following Buckley, constitute
"speech by proxy."22 In this respect, Judge Moore argued, paying peti-
tion circulators resembles making a campaign contribution more than a
campaign expenditure.23
16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-110 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
Any person, corporation, or association of persons who directly or indirectly pays to
or receives from or agrees to pay to or receive from any other person, corporation, or
association of persons any money or other thing of value in consideration of or as an
inducement to the circulation of any initiative or referendum petition or in considera-
tion of or as an inducement to the signing of any such petition commits a ...
felony....
The statute prohibits not only the payment of circulators, but also the receipt of payment for
circulating. The prohibition of paying and the prohibition of receiving payment are correla-
tive, and we do not believe they raise distinctive policy or constitutional issues. Accordingly,
we shall feel free to refer to either prohibition as a shorthand for both.
17. Judge Moore did not publish his opinion, but in Grant 1, Circuit Court Judges Barrett
and Doyle, who formed a majority to affirm, reprinted Judge Moore's opinion and incorpo-
rated it as their own. Grant v. Meyer, 741 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 1212.
19. Id.
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
21. Grant I, 741 F.2d at 1213.
22. California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981).
23. Grant I, 741 F.2d at 1213. Judge Moore's point has its bite, but as an effort to place
the ban on paid circulators within the Buckley category of campaign contribution limits, it is
unsound. The indirect nature of the "speech" inherent in a contribution was only one of the
Supreme Court's stated reasons for treating contribution limits more leniently than expendi-
ture limits. More importantly, in Buckley the Court constitutionalized a distinction between
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Even if treated as analogous to a campaign contribution limit, the
ban on paid circulators needed to be justified by sufficiently strong state
interests to be upheld against a First Amendment challenge. Judge
Moore found such interests in the need to protect the "integrity" of the
initiative process and to assure that the measures appearing on the ballot
had demonstrated "a sufficiently broad base of support.1 2  At this point
his analysis became somewhat tangled because he accepted the State's
denial that the goal of the ban was to prevent illegal acts. He said the
State's integrity concern was that "people may be persuaded to sign peti-
tions for reasons other than the political validity of the cause es-
poused." 25 So explained, the integrity concern seems to merge into the
concern that sufficient support for the measure be demonstrated. On the
other hand, in support of his integrity argument, Judge Moore relied on
evidence of extensive forgery by paid circulators of initiative petitions in
Florida, suggesting that the integrity concern was indeed a concern that
illegal or improper acts be prevented.26
However they might be sorted out analytically, the specific consider-
ations mentioned by Judge Moore in support of the statute were as
follows:
1) Many people were willing to sign petitions for reasons unre-
lated to their content.27
2) There was evidence of forged signatures by paid circulators
in Florida.28
3) Colorado did not routinely check the validity of signatures
on initiative petitions, giving it a valid interest in preventing a prac-
tice that creates a temptation to procure illegal signatures.29 Judge
Moore apparently regarded the non-checking of signatures as a
benefit to initiative proponents that offset the disadvantage of not
being able to use paid circulators.
4) Paid circulators would use techniques of salesmanship to
gain signatures in order to increase their compensation. These
techniques would not be "inherently illegal," but would impair the
integrity of the initiative process.3°
expenditures and contributions, not the stated rationale for drawing the distinction. Judge
Moore's analysis may cast doubt on the wisdom of this distinction, but cannot change it.
24. Grant I, 741 F.2d at 1213.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1214.
27. Id. Paul Grant, one of the plaintiffs, testified to the procedures he and his associates
used in soliciting signatures and volunteered that he obtained signatures more easily when he
told people that it was his birthday. Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, t. App. at 16 (1988).
28. Grant I, 741 F.2d at 1214.
29. Id. This argument is particularly difficult to square with Judge Moore's disclaimer
that the ban is intended to prevent illegal practices.
30. Id.
5) Because the initiative measure, once circulated, cannot be
amended to correct drafting errors, the state has a particularly
strong interest "in seeing that any measure has significant support
to insure only the better reasoned and drafted measures are given
the chance of adoption."3 1
Judge Moore's ruling was affirmed by a three-judge appellate panel
in Grant 1,32 over a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Holloway.33 Sub-
sequently, the Tenth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc, and in
Grant 1134 reversed both Judge Moore's and the three-judge panel's prior
rulings.35 Because Judge Holloway's analysis for the majority, an ex-
panded version of his dissent on the three-judge panel, was closely fol-
lowed in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Supreme Court, separate
consideration of it is not necessary here. Judge Logan wrote a powerful
dissenting opinion, anticipating some of our arguments in this article.36
B. In the United States Supreme Court
Justice Stevens began his analysis for a unanimous Supreme Court
agreeing with Judge Holloway's conclusion "that this case involves a lim-
itation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny,"37 referring,
not surprisingly, to Buckley v. Valeo.38 After observing that the First
Amendment is applicable to the states and that it protects discussion of
issues like trucking deregulation,39 Justice Stevens turned to the crucial
question whether regulation of the circulation of initiative petitions af-
fects the freedom of speech. It does, he asserted, because such circula-
tion "necessarily involves both the expressioh of a desire for political
31. Id. at 1214-15. We regard this as a makeweight argument. The state's interest in
assuring that measures on the ballot have demonstrated public support would not be reduced if
there were some procedure for corrective amendments after or during the circulation period.
Furthermore, the state's interest in assuring that poorly reasoned or drafted measures not be
adopted is adequately served by the election on the measure. Nevertheless, Judge Moore
treated the point as central, and wrote that because of it, his opinion was not to be read as
having any bearing on the validity of a ban on paid circulators for candidate nominating peti-
tions. Id. at 1215.
32. Id. at 1211.
33. Id. at 1215.
34. Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 1448. The vote was 6-2.
36. Id. at 1458-63. Judge Barrett wrote a short dissent, referring to the Moore opinion
adopted by the three-judge panel on which he had served. Id. at 1458. Judge Doyle, who had
been in the majority in Grant I, was no longer sitting on the Tenth Circuit when Grant II was
decided.
37. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1891.
38. 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam).
39. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1891. Just because an opinion is short does not mean that it is
concise.
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change and discussion of the merits of the proposed change."'  Justice
Stevens accepted at face value the testimony of one of the plaintiffs, con-
taining a self-servingly idealized description of the solicitation process,
involving give and take over the merits of the proposal between the circu-
lator and the potential signer.41 He did not refer to other testimony,
dwelt upon by Judge Moore, to the effect that irrelevant considerations,
such as being told that it was the circulator's birthday, influenced people
to sign.42
Having concluded that the circulation of initiative petitions may be
equated with political speech, Justice Stevens could coast the rest of the
way. Banning paid circulators, he said, restricts speech by limiting "the
number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the hours they
can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can
reach."43 This statement echoes the conclusion in Buckley that limiting
campaign spending must reduce either the number of messages ex-
pressed, the depth of the treatment, or the size of the audience, but Jus-
tice Stevens added a supporting reference to Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment,' in which the Court extended first
amendment protection to solicitation of charitable contributions.4' A
second way in which the ban restricts speech is that it makes it more
difficult to qualify initiative proposals for the ballot, thus reducing the
chances for proponents to make their proposals the focus of extensive
debate.46
Next, Justice Stevens concluded it was irrelevant that the Colorado
ban left open all other means of dissemination of ideas regarding initia-
tive measures except the use of paid circulators because the ban "restricts
access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical ave-
nue of political.discourse, direct one-on-one communication."'47 He also
40. Id. Judge Holloway had described the relationship between speech and the circula-
tion of initiative petitions in similarly vague terms, asserting that the solicitation of signatures
is "closely intertwined with a discussion of the merits of the measure." Grant I, 741 F.2d at
1218.
41. Meyer, 108 S.Ct. at 1892 n.4. For a quotation of the testimony, see infra text accom-
panying note 106.
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892.
44. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
45. Id. at 632.
46. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892.
47. Id. at 1893. This statement reveals a deep and most unfortunate confusion of ideas.
As evidence summarized later in this Article shows, the use of paid petition circulators is
indeed often the most "effective" and "economical" means of qualifying a measure for the
ballot. But whereas the adjectives "effective" and "economical" reflect the instrumental point
of view of the proponent, the adjective "fundamental" suggests a much broader point of view.
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responded to an argument made by Judge Logan in the Tenth Circuit, to
the effect that under the authority of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co.,48 the state having created the right of initiative could im-
pose limitations on its exercise. 9 In Posadas, the Court upheld a ban on
advertising for casinos, stating that if a state could ban a product, it
could exercise the lesser restraint of banning its advertising. 0 Judge Lo-
gan's argument was that by analogy, since the state had the right to elim-
inate the initiative process altogether, it could regulate the means of
promoting particular initiatives. Justice Stevens cited Judge Holloway's
sound rejoinder that Posadas, a commercial speech case, was inapplicable
to Meyer v. Grant, which, if it involved speech at all, unquestionably in-
volved political speech."1 Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued, the fact
that the state in Posadas could prohibit advertising for casinos did not
mean that the state could ban advertising on legislative proposals affect-
ing casinos." Therefore, the state's power to eliminate the initiative pro-
cess did not include the power to regulate discussion of political issues.5 3
Before turning to the interests put forth by the State in support of
the ban, Justice Stevens agreed with the court of appeals that the ban
"trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment
protections is 'at its zenith,'" and concluded that the State's burden of
justification was "well-nigh insurmountable."5 4 This may account for
the cursory attention given to the State's justifications.
The first justification was the State's desire to assure that a proposal
At least since the writing of Plato's dialogues, it has been a deep assumption of Western cul-
ture-and perhaps of other great cultures as well-that there is something special about intel-
lectual inquiry that takes the form of a conversation. That special quality is diluted to the
extent one of the parties has a nonintellectual interest in the outcome, and is destroyed-
prostituted is perhaps the most precise expression-when one of the parties is paid to advocate
a particular viewpoint. This does not deny that paid advocacy may be an essential practice, as
in the case of the practice of law, but it does deny that paid advocacy partakes of that "funda-
mental" quality believed to be inherent in free conversation.
48. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
49. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1893.
50. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 34546. Justice Rehnquist's statement in Posadas was sweeping,
and may not turn out to be true in all cases. For an analysis suggesting that the statements of
the Court are an imperfect guide to the commercial speech doctrine as manifested by the
Court's actual decisions, see Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff" Persuasion, Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1205, 1225-47 (1988).
51. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1893-94 (quoting Grant II, 828 F.2d at 1456-57).
52. Id. at 1893.
53. Id. We believe Judge Logan's reliance on Posadas was an unfortunate error, for
whether or not Justice Stevens did so intentionally, he took advantage of it to avoid confronta-
tion with a central question in Meyer. See infra text accompanying note 178. In its brief to the
Supreme Court, Colorado repeated but did not emphasize the argument relying on Posadas.
Appellants' Brief at 14.
54. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1893 (quoting Grant 1I, 828 F.2d at 1457).
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has sufficient public support before it is placed on the ballot.5 Justice
Stevens dismissed this concern in a single sentence, asserting that it is
superfluous, since public support is assured by the requirement that an
initiative petition receive a specified number of signatures. 6
The State's second justification, that the ban protected the integrity
of the initiative process by removing a temptation for circulators wrong-
fully to verify the authenticity of signatures, was rejected on the ground
that there was no evidence that the concern was based on anything more
than speculation.5 7 This was an overstatement because, as shown above,
Judge Moore had credited testimony that paid circulators had forged sig-
natures in Florida.5 Justice Stevens added that since a professional cir-
culator's future business may depend on a reputation for competence and
integrity, it could not be assumed that paid circulators were more likely
to accept false signatures than volunteer circulators. 59 He also pointed to
various Colorado penal provisions protecting against fraud and other im-
proper practices.6 °
Finally, in a footnote, Justice Stevens rejected the suggestion that
the state could "mute the voices of those who can afford to pay petition
circulators."61  His phrasing of the point was designed to lead into a
quotation of the well-known statement in Buckley v. Valeo that "'the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment.' "62 Justice Stevens added that "(t)he concern
that persons who can pay petition circulators may succeed in getting
measures on the ballot when they might otherwise have failed cannot
defeat First Amendment rights. ' 63
C. A Hypothetical
At least twice in his opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized the crimi-
nal penalties that the Colorado ban imposed on those who employ paid
circulators."4 This is a common enough rhetorical ploy in First Amend-
55. Id. at 1894.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Grant I, 741 F.2d at 1214; see supra text accompanying note 28.
59. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1894.
60. Id. at 1894-95; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-106 (1980) (forge signatures); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 1-40-119 (1987) (make false or misleading statements); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-
40-110 (1980) (pay~another to sign a petition).
61. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1894 n.7.
62. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.)
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1891, 1894.
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ment controversies, but here it is symptomatic of a skewed conception of
what the ban does and what it is for. It is true that the Colorado statute
does, in form, define a felony, and that the possibility exists that a person
could be prosecuted for violating it. These facts facilitate viewing the
statute as one aimed at the conduct of private individuals, and therefore
as falling within a conventional first amendment framework. The practi-
cal thrust of the statute is not, however, to regulate individual conduct
but to regulate the state's conduct, namely, the circumstances in which
the State will place propositions on the ballot.
This point becomes evident if we compare the actual Colorado stat-
ute with a hypothetical one. The hypothetical statute does not ban the
use of paid circulators for initiative petitions. Instead, it requires each
circulator to state under oath, on the face of each petition section,
whether he or she has received payment. State election officials, in deter-
mining whether an initiative proposal has qualified for the ballot, are in-
structed not to count signatures obtained by paid circulators.
Would the hypothetical statute be unconstitutional?6" Prior to
Meyer v. Grant, it would have been difficult to mount a persuasive First
Amendment challenge to it. No speech activity is banned. Indeed, no
activity of any sort is banned. The state, without regulating private con-
duct,66 simply is exercising the power to select which propositions to
place on the ballot.
After Meyer v. Grant, it would be awkward for the Court to uphold
the hypothetical statute. The reason, of course, is that its effect is virtu-
ally identical to the statute the Court struck down in Meyer. It is not
simply that, as a practical matter, no one would employ professional cir-
culators under the hypothetical statute, although that surely is true.
Rather, there is almost no difference between what is forbidden under the
two statutes. Under the actual Colorado statute, nothing prevented the
plaintiffs from employing individuals to circulate petitions urging the
government to deregulate trucking. Probably nothing prevented them
from printing these petitions to look similar or even identical to initiative
petitions, at least as long as they did not deceive signers into believing the
65. The reader might envision a challenge by persons who signed a petition circulated by
a paid circulator, on the ground that failure by the state to count their signatures would deny
them equal protection of the laws. However, if the hypothetical statute made it clear that paid
circulators must disclose to signers that their signatures were ineffective and that signers of
paid petitions were free to sign volunteer petitions, it is difficult to see in what way the statute
would discriminate against those who. chose to sign the paid petitions.
66. The requirement that circulators disclose whether they have been paid might be
deemed a sort of regulation, but it is not different in kind from the other disclosures and
avowals circulators are required to make.
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documents were real initiative petitions. Finally, nothing prevented
them from delivering such petitions to State officials, including the State
officials charged to receive initiative petitions, so long as they made it
clear that they were not filing them as initiative petitions. Essentially,
what they could do under the actual statute was precisely what they
would be able to do under the hypothetical statute. The only difference is
that the mechanism for disclosure under the hypothetical statute would
not remove the label of "initiative petition" from the documents the
plaintiffs' employees could circulate, though the documents would be
rendered ineffective for the purpose an initiative petition is intended to
serve.
Even the existence of the criminal sanction in the Colorado statute
does not distinguish it from the hypothetical statute. In the latter, the
disclosure by the circulators of whether they have been paid is made
under oath, presumably exposing the circulators to prosecution for per-
jury, or for some lesser violation such as fraud, in the case of false
disclosure.
To regard the Colorado statute but not the hypothetical one as vio-
lating the First Amendment would be to exalt form over substance. Yet,
if the hypothetical statute had been presented to the Court instead of the
real one, we are convinced that the question would have seemed far more
difficult to the Justices. Possibly, the First Amendment challenge would
have appeared frivolous.
It is possible that readers, having been impressed by Justice Stevens'
analysis summarized above,67 or having initially reacted to the question
in the same way as he did, may be comfortable with the idea that the
hypothetical statute, though different in form, is just as unconstitutional
as the real statute. Readers may even be convinced that had they been
confronted originally with the hypothetical statute they would have re-
garded it as unconstitutional, perhaps because they would have con-
verted it mentally into something like the Colorado statute.
Certainly, at this point, we have said nothing to demonstrate that
the hypothetical statute is or ought to be constitutional. Nevertheless,
lawyers have known for a long time that the way a question is asked has
a lot to do with how the question is answered. The question the Court
asked and answered was whether the state could prohibit the plaintiffs
from paying individuals to circulate initiative petitions. We believe that
given the plain need to ration the limited number of ballot positions, the
more pertinent question is whether the state may choose a system in
67. See supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
which the requisite level of support must be demonstrated by the willing-
ness of volunteers to devote time and effort to circulate petitions. In the
remainder of this article we shall attempt to demonstrate why this for-
mulation of the question is preferable and why, given this formulation,
Meyer v. Grant is mistaken.
In Part III we consider the argument that the ban on paid circula-
tors is justified as a means of preventing fraud and other improper prac-
tices. Although the state was equivocal in advancing this argument, we
shall show that evidence exists to warrant taking this problem seriously.
We do not conclude, however, that the ban's usefulness in preventing
fraud, by itself, resolves the constitutional question.
In Part IV we turn to the state's argument that the ban is needed to
assure that initiatives that qualify for the ballot have demonstrated popu-
lar support. We argue that Justice Stevens' treatment of this question is
inadequate, and that the heavy reliance on paid circulators today is seri-
ously inconsistent with the purposes of the initiative qualification pro-
cess. The widespread negative reaction to the many special interest
groups that bought their way onto the California ballot in the 1988 gen-
eral election shows that this problem is timely and serious.68 Part IV
also contains a digression in which we consider the pros and cons of the
distribution of initiative petitions by direct mail.
Our argument that paid circulators are inconsistent with the pur-
pose of initiative qualification requirements is connected to our final con-
stitutional argument, set forth in Part V, which is that the ban on paid
circulators does not constitute a regulation of speech that requires ex-
traordinary justification under the First Amendment. Unlike Justice Ste-
vens, we turn to this point last because we believe it cannot be considered
adequately without a proper understanding of the environment in which
the ban operates.
In Part VI we consider what can be done in the wake of Meyer v.
Grant. We do not propose adoption of our hypothetical statute. If
proper respect is to be shown for the principle of stare decisis, it would be
better to overrule Meyer than to pretend that our hypothetical statute
can be reconciled with it. And we do not assume that Meyer will be
overruled soon. Instead, we propose a variation on our hypothetical stat-
ute, one whose practical effects are not at all identical to those of the
Colorado statute, and whose rationale, in one respect at least, is
grounded in some of the reasoning in Meyer.
68. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
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III. Fraud and Paid Circulators
In this Part we review the evidence that exists regarding the use of
improper practices by paid and unpaid circulators. There is a surpris-
ingly substantial amount of such evidence, though inevitably it is anecdo-
tal and fragmentary. However, given the large number of petitions
circulated in the last twenty years, the evidence is not conclusive that
abusive circulation tactics are extremely common or that they are more
likely to be associated with paid than with unpaid circulators.
At the outset, we must define what we mean by "improper or abu-
sive practices." Within this phrase we include the submission of forged
signatures and other significant violations of law, such as verification of a
petition section by a person other than the actual circulator (perhaps be-
cause the actual circulator was underage or otherwise ineligible). We
also include significant deception, whether or not it is prohibited by law.
Examples include covering official portions of the petition with mislead-
ing cards or labels, or oral mischaracterization of the petition. However,
we do not include superficial, oversimplified, or irrelevant appeals, so
long as they are not flagrantly deceptive. Such appeals are common, as-
sociated with both volunteer and professional circulators, and probably
inevitable. However unattractive they may be, these practices are not
"improper" or "abusive," as we are using those terms in this Part.
One possible indicator of the incidence of improper circulation prac-
tices is the validity rate of signatures that are obtained and submitted.
An analysis by the Ohio Secretary of State's office of three initiatives
appearing on the ballot in 1983 showed that the two measures circulated
by volunteers had averaged a validity rate of 83.5 percent, while the mea-
sure circulated by professionals had only a 68.7 percent validity rate.69
We are aware of no other comparative studies of this nature, but the
manager of one of the largest professional signature-gatherer firms gave
us similar estimates.7 °
Assuming that volunteer circulators generally yield a higher validity
rate than their paid counterparts, this could indicate a higher incidence
of abuse among professionals, but not necessarily. To the extent that
there is significant forgery of signatures, a reasonably efficient validation
69. Letter from Margaret Rosenfield, Director of Elections Programs for the Ohio Secre-
tary of State's Office, to Sue Thomas, National Center for Initiative Review (June 20, 1984)
(copy on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
70. Interview with Kelly Kimball, President of Kimball Petition Management, at 14
(well-trained volunteer groups will obtain a validity rate of 77-80%, while professionals will
get around 70%); see also Interview with Mike Arno, at 13 (volunteers do not try to cheat as
much as paid circulators because "they're not there for the money, they're there for the
cause.").
process in government offices will expose it, and the validity rate will be
lowered. However, other possible causes of lower validity rates do not
imply the presence of impropriety. For example, volunteers may be
more likely than paid circulators to take care that only registered voters
sign the petition.7 Furthermore, some improper practices, such as de-
ception regarding the content of the petition, would not be likely to affect
the validity rate.
In summary, there is evidence, albeit fragmentary, that professional
circulators produce a higher percentage of invalid signatures than volun-
teers. This evidence is at most suggestive of the relative extent of impro-
priety associated with the two categories of circulators.
Aside from such comparative evidence, there are a number of well-
documented instances of abuse by professional circulators. Four such
circulators were criminally charged in Nebraska with petition fraud and
falsely attesting to names on petitions in connection with an initiative to
establish a state lottery.72 According to the Nebraska Secretary of State,
the lottery proponents were the first in recent years to pay persons to
gather signatures.
In the same year, 1986, a lottery petition in North Dakota also re-
sulted in criminal convictions of at least five paid circulators.73 The
fraudulent signatures submitted by these people included names copied
from a phone book, names of minor children, and duplicate signatures.
Although a prosecutor told us he thought the incident was an isolated
one, 74 the North Dakota Legislature reacted by banning payment to cir-
culators on a per signature basis, though not payment of salaries to
circulators.
71. To a large extent, the lower validity rate in professional signature-gathering cam-
paigns reflects an agency cost to the manager of the campaign. As one such manager told us, if
the professional circulator knows he will be paid if he gets at least 70% valid signatures, he
will get 70% and not much higher. Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 14. The invalid signa-
tures may, but need not be, the result of improper practices.
72. Interview with Allen Beermann, Nebraska Secretary of State (June 14, 1989). At the
time of the interview two of these individuals had been convicted and the other two were
awaiting trial.
73. Interview with John Goff, Assistant Cass County State's Attorney (June 20, 1989); see
E. JAKSHA, OF THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRACY AND THE PETITION PROCESS, 111, 112 (1988)
(quoting a prosecutor to the effect that the circulators were "greedy for quarters").
74. Interview with John Golf, supra note 73.
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-12 (1989 Cum. Supp). It seems unlikely that this form
of ban can survive Meyer v. Grant. The state might argue that it is a better crafted and nar-
rower attack on the problem of abusive practices than Colorado's total ban on payments, but
in Meyer the Court found the problem of abuse insufficient to support a ban. Although the
present study suggests that Justice Stevens' statements in support of this conclusion were
overly sweeping, it does not provide a basis for challenging the conclusion. Furthermore, the
North Dakota ban, while narrower, may not be better crafted. It is hard to see how the state
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Possibly the most extensively documented incident of abuse by paid
circulators occurred in California in 1972, in connection with the qualifi-
cation of a farm labor initiative by growers. Massive evidence of im-
proper practices by paid circulators was gathered by the United Farm
Workers and delivered to then Secretary of State Jerry Brown, who filed
a lawsuit seeking to have the measure removed from the ballot.7 6 The
lawsuit was dismissed on the ground that there was insufficient time to
litigate the issue before the ballot needed to be final, but after the election
several individuals were convicted of forgery and other crimes in connec-
tion with the circulation of the initiative, and the Assembly conducted
extensive hearings on the incident.77 Among the practices documented
at the hearings were the extensive use of children to circulate petitions7
and the use of "dodger cards," consisting of cardboard containing a brief
slogan, to cover up the official summary of the measure as it was
presented to potential signers.79
There have been more recent, though less celebrated incidents in
California. Probably the most serious of these occurred in 1979 in con-
nection with an initiative sponsored by landlords, construction unions,
and real estate interests for appearance on the 1980 ballot to repeal ex-
isting local rent control ordinances and create restrictions on the ability
of municipalities to adopt new ones. Then Attorney General George
Deukmejian gave the title "Rent Control" to the initiative, which ena-
bled petition circulators to represent to potential signers that the propo-
could prevent a petition manager from firing a salaried circulator who was unproductive. Yet,
if productivity were necessary for the circulator to continue on salary, the incentives would not
be drastically different than under a pay per signature system. The North Dakota statute
would probably have little effect beyond modestly decreasing the efficiency of a professional
signature-gathering cimpaign.
76. The authors of this Article were then on the Secretary of State's staff, and worked on
the suit in Brown's behalf. No doubt as a result of this experience, we entered into this project
anticipating that the argument based on abusive practices would provide a major ground for
criticism of Meyer v. Grant. Our research has persuaded us that although the problem is a
significant one, it is not as great as we had imagined, and is offset by self-controlling incentives
within the professional signature gathering industry. The considerations raised in later parts
of this Article now seem to us to be more fundamental.
77. See Cal. Assembly Comm. on Elections and Reapportionment, Public Hearing on the
Initiative Process (Los Angeles, Oct. 10, 1972). Those hearings still probably represent the best
single source of information regarding initiative circulation practices, especially by profession-
als, although the information is now considerably dated. Regarding fraud in the circulation of
the farm labor petitions, see generally Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions:
Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505,
523-24 (1982).
78. See Hearing, supra note 77, at 65-66.
79. See id. at 48-49.
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sal was for the adoption of rent control. 80 No criminal charges resulted
from this petition drive, but misrepresentation apparently was wide-
spread. When a circulator who was asking passers-by, "Would you like
to sign our petition for lower rent in California?" was confronted by a
journalist, he admitted that "this [petition] is a ripoff. We're getting paid
for doing this. This is a landlord initiative."81
Several recent incidents in California did result in criminal charges.
One circulator of an AIDS initiative-sponsored by Lyndon
LaRouche-that appeared on the 1986 general election ballot was con-
victed of falsely claiming to be a resident of California. 2 In 1987, an
individual was convicted of falsifying signatures on petitions for what in
1988 became Proposition 68, the Campaign Spending Limitation Act.83
The individual submitted 10,000 signatures in San Francisco that had
been copied from a telephone book.84
In 1986 the office of the California Secretary of State hired her first
full-time election fraud investigator.8 The investigator discovered seven
circulators who appeared to have engaged in substantial violations of the
law. She referred these seven to local district attorneys for possible fel-
ony prosecutions. Three were convicted or pled guilty to violations of
the Elections Code.86 All of the cases investigated involved paid petition
circulators. 87
80. Kelly Kimball told us he refused to handle the landlords' measure after he saw the
title because tests convinced him it would be impossible to prevent his paid circulators from
misrepresenting the initiative on the street. He believed it would be contrary to the long-range
interests of his firm to be associated with that kind of deception, and pointedly observed that
the firm that did handle the landlords' petition soon went out of business because they "got a
reputation off of that as being liars, unethical." Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 15-16.
81. Wood, Rent Initiative-FWhat's in a Name?, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1979, at B1, col 4.
82. Interview with Kent Freeman, Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney (May
25, 1989). According to Mr. Freeman, a second person was awaiting trial on similar charges.
Apparently several out-of-state people were imported to circulate LaRouche's initiative. Some
were paid on a per signature basis, but others were essentially volunteers, provided only with
living and transportation expenses. Mr. Freeman expressed the opinion that the fraudulent
claim to California residency occurred to an equal extent among the paid and unpaid
circulators.
83. Since one of the present authors was closely identified with the drafting of Proposition
68, and the other signed a ballot pamphlet argument in its favor, we add our hope and belief
that this was an isolated incident.
84. Interview with Kelly Kimball.
85. The information in this paragraph is derived from an interview with Pat White, elec-
tion fraud investigator for the California Secretary of State, November 6, 1989.
86. Charges against one of the remaining four circulators were dismissed in the interests
of justice; charges against another are pending; arrest warrants have been issued for the other
two, who cannot be located.
87. The cases were referred to her either by county officials or the companies who hired
the paid circulators. One paid circulator was convicted after a county employee noticed on a
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Although these incidents demonstrate that the problem of abuse as-
sociated with professional circulators is not an insubstantial one, viewing
the evidence as a constitutional justification for a ban on paid circulators
is deficient in two respects.
First, given the large numbers of petitions that have been circulated
by professionals in the last two decades and the enormous number of
circulators employed, the incidents are not numerous enough to show
that the problem is pervasive. If only a small percentage of the incidents
that actually occur come to light, then the showing we have made is
impressive. But many of the signatures submitted are checked, and peti-
tion circulation, though an obscure practice, by its nature cannot be car-
lied out in private. Therefore, it could be that the incidents described
above constitute a fairly large percentage of the total amount of abuse
that has occurred.
Second, the incidents of abuse associated with professional circula-
tors do not prove in themselves that impropriety is any less prevalent
among volunteer circulators. In at least one of the incidents described
above, the LaRouche AIDS fraud regarding residency, both volunteer
and paid circulators engaged in abuse. 8 David Magleby reported that
"[o]ne of the most blatant cases of deception and fraud in signature gath-
ering," involving falsification and fraudulent notarization of signatures,
occurred in Colorado, where the use of professionals was illegal.8 9
The number of incidents of abuse that have come to light have been
more numerous for professional than for volunteer circulators. As evi-
dence, this is strengthened by a study covering the period 1980-1984,
finding that two-thirds of all initiatives that qualified for statewide ballots
were circulated by volunteers alone, and only twenty-six percent utilized
professional circulators for more than one-third of their signatures. 90
Nevertheless, the unsystematic nature of our survey of incidents suggests
that any conclusion that abuse is more common among professional cir-
culators must be tentative.
petition the name of a person whose funeral the employee had attended. Yet, the petition
contained a "signature" of the deceased dated well after the date of the funeral. Apparently,
the circulator had copied names from a telephone book. Another fraud was uncovered when a
county employee noted a colleague's name on a petition and, spotting the colleague in the
office, called out, "I see that you have signed this petition I am checking." The coworker
denied signing the petition.
88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
89. MAGLEBY, supra note 6, at 63.
90. Schmidt, Studies Show Initiatives Are Nonpartisan, Grassroots Politics, 5 THE INrrIA-
TIVE NEWS REPORT, Nov. 30, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
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In Meyer v. Grant, Justice Stevens pointed out that volunteers, moti-
vated by the desire to qualify the measure, might have as much of an
incentive to engage in impropriety as a professional, motivated by the
desire to receive more money.91 We do not doubt that ideological zeal
may induce abuses in individual cases, but it seems unlikely to us that it
will have this effect as often as will the profit motive, if only because the
volunteer who believes strongly in his or her cause may be less likely to
believe that deception will be necessary to persuade others to support
that same cause.
But even if we are right and Justice Stevens is wrong, the petition
circulating firm, as opposed to the individual professional circulator, still
has a professional interest in controlling abuse.92 Abuse consisting of
forged or fraudulent signatures may result in the failure of the measure to
qualify for the ballot, and abuse consisting of flagrant misrepresentation,
if publicized, may doom the measure once it appears on the ballot.93 A
petition management firm that creates these difficulties for its clients will
suffer considerable competitive disadvantage.
In California, where the "initiative industry" is more advanced than
elsewhere, one firm enjoyed a monopoly over professional petition circu-
lation until the early 1970s. 94 The worst incidents of abuse, in 1972 and
1979, came less than a decade after the demise of that monopoly, in peti-
tion drives conducted by firms that are no longer in business. Abuse may
tend to peak during such periods of shake-up in the industry and to de-
cline once greater stability takes effect, though the cost of supervision
suggests that a residue of impropriety is likely to endure.95
Evaluating our findings, we believe the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton was correct in concluding that the possible association of paid peti-
tion circulators with improper practices was sufficient to justify a ban on
paid circulators as an exercise of the police power.96 If it is assumed that
the ban significantly infringes First Amendment rights of speech, Judge
Holloway and Justice Stevens probably were correct in concluding that
as an empirical matter, the danger of impropriety is not great enough to
justify the ban.
91. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1894.
92. See supra note 80.
93. See Lowenstein, supra note 77, at 566-67.
94. See Fitzgerald, Computer Democracy, 11 CAL. J. 6 (Supp. June 1980).
95. The well-established firms in California report -extensive and even high tech proce-
dures for rooting out false signatures. Interview with Mike Arno, at 13; Interview with Kelly
Kimball, at 14.
96. State v. Conifer Enterprises, 82 Wash. 2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973).
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This conclusion is strengthened by the criticism we offer of Meyer v.
Grant in Part IV. There we argue that the willingness of citizens to sign
initiative petitions when asked, as opposed to the ability of a proponent
to provide sufficient circulators to do the asking, is inadequate, as a mea-
sure of public support for a proposal, to serve as the rationing device for
places on the ballot. It follows from this proposition that even if fraud
were fairly widespread, the adverse consequential effects on the system
might be surprisingly modest. Put simply, the point is that whether or
not abuse is common, initiative proponents do not need to engage in it in
order to succeed. This does not in any sense justify improper practices,
for the integrity of the electoral system is an important value even when
improprieties do not have an immediate distorting effect on outcomes.
But in the absence of adverse systemic effects, Judge Holloway and Jus-
tice Stevens are correct that prohibitions of particular improprieties, en-
forceable against individual violators, are sufficient. Prophylactic
measures, such as a ban on paid circulators, are justified only to prevent
adverse systemic consequences, and in the case of fraud in the circulation
of initiatives, these consequences may not be present.9
7
IV. The Initiative Qualification Process
A. The Collection of Signatures
In this section we report and evaluate the evidence that exists on the
nonabusive techniques that are used to collect signatures on petitions and
on whether a person's signing of a petition necessarily evidences agree-
ment with the substance of the petition. In the following section we con-
sider the implications of our findings in a more general analysis of the
functions served by the petition requirement in the initiative qualification
process. In the final section of this Part we digress from our critique of
Meyer v. Grant to consider briefly a new technique for the circulation of
initiative petitions, the use of direct mail.
L Social Science Studies
Numerous experiments conducted by psychologists have found that
although agreement with the content is a significant variable influencing
whether subjects will sign petitions, various other factors, such as the
way in which the solicitor is dressed, and whether the subject has seen
another person agree or decline to sign, influence the signing decision as
97. Also relevant to this conclusion is the fact that special interests have not been success-
ful in getting unpopular initiatives adopted by the voters after buying their way onto the ballot
by using paid circulators. See Lowenstein, supra note 77.
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much or more.98 In one of these experiments, subjects were given vari-
ous personality tests after they had either agreed or declined to sign a
petition. The results showed, not surprisingly, that those who signed a
petition they probably did not believe in, or vice versa, scored higher on
tests measuring propensity to conform to social pressure than those who
followed their convictions in signing or not signing the petitions.99 The
conclusion drawn in one of these studies is applicable to all of them con-
sidered collectively: "The findings cast doubt on the validity of the un-
restricted assertion that the larger the number of signatures for a
petition, the more widespread the sentiment in favor of the proposed
change."' "o
Other social scientists have relied on questionnaires sent to signers
of actual petitions. For example, questionnaires were sent in October
1968 to signers of George Wallace nominating petitions. The same ques-
tionnaires were sent to a similar sample of voters who had not signed the
Wallace petitions. The results showed that petition-signers were signifi-
cantly more likely to express an intention to vote for Wallace in the presi-
dential election than nonsigners, but that among those who signed, fewer
than half intended to vote for him. Indeed, among the Wallace petition-
signers, Wallace was running second to Nixon. 10 ' The authors of the
study concluded that their data "should serve to dispel any notion that
the number of petition signatures gathered was a reliable index of Wal-
lace's personal popularity."" °2
98. Blake, Mouton & Hain, Social Forces in Petition-Signing, 37 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 385
(1956) (strength of the request to sign, knowledge of others' agreeing or declining to sign);
Helson, Blake & Mouton, Petition-Signing as Adjustment to Situational and Personal Factors,
48 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 3 (1958) (knowledge of others' agreeing or declining to sign);
Suedfeld, Bochner & Matas, Petitioner's Attire and Petition Signing by Peace Demonstrators: A
Field Experiment, 1 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 278 (1971) (whether solicitor was dressed con-
ventionally or as a "hippie"); Garrett & Wallace, Effect of Communicator-Communicatee Sim-
ilarity in Political Affiliation upon Petition-Signing Compliance, 90 J. PSYCHOLOGY 95 (1975)
(whether petition was sponsored by Republicans or Democrats). But see Bryant, Petitioning:
Dress Congruence Versus Belief Congruence, 5 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 144 (1975) (subjects
were influenced by how the solicitor was dressed, but only when they had no strong beliefs
regarding the content of the petition).
99. Helson, Blake & Mouton, supra note 98, at 7-9.
100. Blake, Mouton and Hain, supra note 98, at 389-90.
101. Wilcox & Weinberg, Petition-Signing in the 1968 Election, 24 W. POL. Q. 731 (1971).
102. Id. at 733. The authors added that their data
serve to illustrate an ironic feature of the political process. The various state laws
which require that third parties wishing to appear on the ballot must receive the
prior [']approval' of a substantial percentage of the electorate were designed to retard
the formation or, at least, legitimation of new political contestants. However, be-
cause of the observed inclination of many voters to sign petitions to whose purpose
they are, at best, only marginally committed, this barrier seems to have been proven
not quite so formidable.
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A questionnaire sent to voters in Riverside, California, yielded simi-
lar findings. One group had signed petitions for a no-growth initiative;
the other group had not signed. The signers were significantly more
likely to have voted in favor of the measure, but only by a margin of 71.7
percent to 55.4 percent.10 3 In another study, nearly a third of those who
signed a petition to place a water resources control measure on the Idaho
ballot said in a questionnaire a year to sixteen months later that they had
never heard of the measure.'4 The authors suggested that this memory
decay "may result from the signing of the petition being an incidental
act-intentional only in the most minimal sense."' 1 5
2. Anecdotal Evidence
In addition to the social science studies, inferences can be drawn
about the meaningfulness of signatures on initiative petitions from the
ample public testimony offered by persons experienced in the circulation
of petitions. Justice Stevens credited this description by Paul Grant, one
of the plaintiffs in Meyer v. Grant:
[T]he way we go about soliciting signatures is that you ask the
person-first of all, you interrupt the person in their walk or
whatever they are doing. You intrude upon them and ask them,
"Are you a registered voter?["]
If you get a yes, then you tell the person your purpose, that
you are circulating a petition to qualify the issue on the ballot in
November, and tell them what about, and they say, 'Please let me
know a little bit more.' Typically, that takes maybe a minute or
two, the process of explaining to the persons that you are trying to
put the initiative on the ballot to exempt Colorado transportation
from [State Public Utilities Commission] regulations.
Then you ask the person if they will sign your petition. If they
hesitate, you try to come up with additional arguments to get them
to sign.
Id. at 739.
103. Neiman & Gottdiener, The Relevance of the Qualifying Stage of Initiative Politics: The
Case of Petition Signing, 63 Soc. Sci. Q. 582, 585 (1982). In the actual election, the proposi-
tion was defeated by a narrow margin. Therefore, the group returning the questionnaire was
modestly skewed in support of the proposition. Taking this into account, probably about a
third of the signers of the petitions voted against the measure when it appeared on the ballot.
104. Pierce & Lovrich, Survey Measurement of Political Participation: Selective Effects of
Recall in Petition Signing, 63 Soc. Sci. Q. 164 (1982). The measure never appeared on the
ballot because the initiative drive was terminated when the legislature passed a statute accom-
plishing many of its objectives. Id.
105. Id. at 168.
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PAID INITIATIVE PETITION CIRCULATORS
[We try] to explain the not just deregulation [sic] in this indus-
try .... [Two paragraphs follow summarizing the substantive ar-
guments that, according to Grant, were used to try to get people to
sign.] 10
6
That is one version of how the process works, one that Justice Ste-
vens described as providing "an example of advocacy of political reform
that falls squarely within the protections of the First Amendment." 107
Here is another version from a published interview with the late Ed
Koupal, the most successful manager of volunteer petition drives in Cali-
fornia during the 1970s:
"Generally, people who are out getting signatures are too god-
damned interested in their ideology to get the required number in
the required time," Koupal said. "We use the hoopla process.
First, you set up a table with six petitions taped to it and a sign in
front that says, SIGN HERE. One person sits at the table. An-
other person stands in front. That's all you need-two people.
"While one person sits at the table, the other walks up to peo-
ple and asks two questions. (We operate on the old selling maxim
that two yesses make a sale.) First, we ask if they are a registered
voter. If they say yes, we ask them if they are registered in that
county. If they say yes to that, we immediately push them up to
the table where the person sitting points to a petition and says,
'Sign this.' By this time the person feels, 'Oh, goodie, I get to play,'
and signs it. If a table doesn't get 80 signatures an hour using this
method, it's moved the next day."
Koupal said that about 75 percent of the people sign when
they're told to. "Hell no, people don't ask to read the petition and
we certainly don't offer," he added. "Why try to educate the world
when you're trying to get signatures?"' 8
Justice Stevens is not on record on the question whether this too provides
"an example of advocacy of political reform that falls squarely within the
protections of the First Amendment."'' 9
Which version is more accurate? Grant and Koupal described ex-
tremes, and in any event, it would be a mistake to assume that the same
techniques are used by all circulators or in all signature drives. Never-
theless, based on our personal experience and observations and our read-
ing or listening to the accounts of others, we are convinced that at least
106. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892 n.4 (quoting 2 Record 10-11).
107. Id.
108. Duscha, The Koupals'Petition Factory, 6 CAL. J. 83, 83 (1975). Another of Koupal's
maxims was that "a signature table [is] not a library." Interview with Joyce Koupal, at 4. In
the 1970s, Joyce and Ed Koupal were codirectors of the People's Lobby of California, an
organization that had considerable success in qualifying initiatives for the ballot in California
using volunteers.
109. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892 n.4.
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in California, where the pressure to collect large numbers of signatures in
a short time period is enormous, the typical practice is closer to, though
not as extreme as, the method described by Koupal. For example, Kelly
Kimball described the training provided to the thousands of circulators
he employs as follows:
Our training is, the first thing you do is ask [potential signers]
which county are you registered to vote in. [Then we ask] will you
sign a petition for [a] California state lottery. For the most part
that's all you have to say. If they want more information, you have
a second line. California lottery is good for schools. Well, they
want more information. At that point you hand them a petition
and text sheet. You say come back to me if you want to sign it.
After two or three lines it doesn't become cost effective to argue with
a person. 110
Kimball also volunteered the opinion that people "sign because you ask
them to sign." ' Nearly every account of signature-gathering contains
the assertion that a large percentage of solicitees will sign with little or no
inquiry or perusal of the petition." I2 Another virtually universal observa-
tion is that one of the most effective signature-gathering techniques by-
passes the content of the proposal entirely. Large numbers sign in
response to the statement that the petition is only for the purpose of get-
ting the measure on the ballot, so that the signer need not decide now
110. Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 28 (emphasis added). For a similar account, see K.
Smith, Beating the Big Boys: Common Cause and the California Campaign for Political Re-
form 105-06 (1978) (unpublished dissertation University of Southern California School of Pub-
lic Administration, June 1978), quoted in Magleby, Ballot Access for Initiatives and Popular
Reforendums: The Importance of Petition Circulation and Signature Validation Procedures, 2
J.L. & POL. 287, 300 (1985).
111. Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 17. He added that
the reason you sign a petition when you're approached at a store is first of all you
don't want to look stupid.... You don't want to say no because you might have to
argue the issue and you don't know enough about the issue, you don't want to look
stupid.
Id. at 18. He explained that in fact the circulator would not be likely to start an argument, but
that the signer might have that fear anyway, so that the safest and simplest course is to sign
and leave. Id.
112. In addition to the quotations from Ed Koupal and Kelly Kimball above, see, e.g., Self,
Initiatives Prove Voters Will Sign Anything; Yet Real Initiative May Get Real Action, L.A.
Times, Nov. 7, 1988, § 2, at 5, col. 1 (paid petition circulator reported that "[e]ighty percent of
the folks I approached were willing to sign anything, with no more than a hasty glance at a few
words"); MAGLEBY, supra note 6, at 62 (citing a study reporting that the "experience of most
crew chiefs is that most people will sign petitions"); CRONIN, supra note 12, at 64 ("perhaps
half of those who sign petitions have only a vague idea of what they are signing"); Price, The
Mercenaries Who Gather Signatures for Ballot Measures, 12 CAL. J. 357, 358 (1981) (quoting
crew chief as saying a "very high percentage of people will sign an initiative petition when
approached.... [O]nly a few will turn us down.").
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whether he or she favors its substance." 3 Finally, we should not over-
look the testimony of Paul Grant, omitted by Justice Stevens, that for all
his substantive arguments, he found people more willing to sign when he
told them it was his birthday." 4
3. Summary
Taken as a whole, the social science studies and anecdotal evidence
present a consistent and plausible picture. The degree to which potential
signers agree with the merits of a petition is a significant but not crucial
factor in their willingness to sign. Many other considerations go into the
decision. These considerations undoubtedly are more important for
some people, such as those particularly susceptible to casual social pres-
sure, than for others. Petition circulators, whether professional or volun-
teer, can succeed, if they are willing to put in the effort, by relying on two
general principles. First, they can use their experience and training to
attempt to create a situation in which the social pressure to sign is rela-
tively high. Second, they can adapt to the need for large numbers of
signatures by ignoring potential signers for whom persuasion requires
more than a few seconds. Because of this second factor, although there
may be some circulators who rely on extensive argument in the manner
described by Paul Grant in his testimony, most circulators, especially
those most likely to be successful, discipline themselves to avoid signifi-
cant discussion and concentrate on numbers.
As to the signers, if the question is whether as a group they are more
likely to support the substance of the petition than a comparable group of
nonsigners, the answer is yes. If the question is whether the ability to
obtain signatures is a reasonably accurate measure of public support for
the substance of the petition, the answer is no. The latter point is vividly
demonstrated by this statistic: One petition management firm was re-
tained in a total of fifty-three petition drives through 1988, and fifty-two
of these qualified for the ballot."I5 The statement that under present con-
ditions, anyone willing to put up the funds can buy a place on the ballot
113. See Interview with Joyce Koupal, at 4; Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 18;
MAGLEBY, supra note 6, at 62; CRONIN, supra note 12, at 64.
114. See supra notes 27, 42.
115. Kelly Kimball, head of Kimball Petition Management, gave these figures at the Has-
tings conference. The 52 successful drives are listed in a document provided to the authors by
Mr. Kimball and on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. They consist of 24
statewide California measures, 19 local California measures, and 9 out-of-state measures. The
cause for the firm's only failure was not an inability to obtain the targeted number of signa-
tures, but a higher-than-anticipated invalidity rate. Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 22.
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is no hyperbole." 6
B. The Functions of Circulation
It is generally conceded that the initiative was adopted in large part
as a reaction against the perceived domination of state legislatures by
special interest groups who were able to use their wealth and a variety of
improper practices to enact laws benefiting themselves at public expense
and to defeat popularly supported legislation that they opposed.' 1 7
The state may not create a legislative mechanism and exclude from
it some group of citizens such as the rich and the well-organized, even for
such a benign purpose as correcting an existing imbalance. But while no
one may be excluded, nothing prevents the state from designing an insti-
tution so that it will be especially responsive to the needs of certain
groups, especially if it may plausibly be supposed that those groups are
relatively deprived elsewhere in the system. As Justice Frankfurter ob-
served in his dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr,118 institutions of direct
democracy, like all other electoral mechanisms, are controversial because
they are conducive to the needs of some interests relative to others. In-
deed, one of the guiding principles of the Constitution itself was to create
a balance among institutions each of which would tend to be most re-
sponsive to different groups and interests.
Therefore, it was permissible for the states to adopt the initiative in
the hope that it would serve primarily as a vehicle for dispersed popular
movements that tend to be more disadvantaged in legislative lobbying
than narrower but better organized groups. 119 It also was permissible for
states to design the initiative as a safety valve for groups experiencing
intense discontent. Such groups, without the means to attract serious
attention to their proposals in the state legislature, might not enjoy ma-
116. If no better reform can be devised, it would be an improvement on the present system
to sell places on the ballot for the $400,000 to $700,000 that it costs to hire one of the leading
firms, depending on whether the measure is a statute or constitutional amendment. A useless
exercise would be avoided, and a modicum of relief would be provided to beleaguered state
treasuries.
117. See generally CRONIN, supra note 12, at 54-57; R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF RE-
FORM 254-62 (1955); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 30-50
(1966); G. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 139-40 (1951).
118. 369 U.S. 186, 299 (1962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
119. The classic theoretical demonstration of the disadvantage of large, dispersed groups
relative to concentrated groups is M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
For a recent empirical confirmation, based on evidence regarding lobbying at the federal level,
see K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 58-
119 (1986).
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jority support but might be mollified by having at least the opportunity to
present their proposals to the voters.
Plainly, the state cannot make the ballot available to every proposal.
The number of proposals on the ballot must be kept to a small number so
that citizens, who are not legislative specialists and most of whose time
perforce must be devoted to private concerns, can sufficiently inform
themselves. 120 The strong adverse reaction to the large number of pro-
positions on the ballot in the California general election in 1988 shows
that this is no mere theoretical concern. 121
Conceivably, a state could resolve this problem by adopting a quota.
For example, the state might provide that there can be no more than six
initiatives on the ballot at any one election. 122 Then, anyone could offer a
proposal, but if the total number of initiatives exceeded the quota, those
appearing on the ballot would be determined by first-come, first-served,
or by lot.
Plainly, however, any such method would prevent the initiative
from serving its purpose as a legislative institution especially available to
groups that are dispersed, broad-based, and highly dedicated to their leg-
islative causes. For this reason, all states with an initiative process have
chosen to rely on a petition system. In the absence of a quota, the overall
requirements must be sufficiently difficult that, generally speaking, the
number of initiatives qualifying for each election ballot will be within the
limits regarded as reasonable for voters.
In the conception of Judge Holloway and Justice Stevens, the mea-
sure of public sentiment regarding an issue is the number of voters in the
population who either support the proposition and therefore are willing
to sign petitions, or at least can be persuaded by a circulator to sign. A
moment's reflection will make it evident, however, that even in a very
unrealistic world in which all potential signers have an opinion on the
proposal and only those who favor it will sign, the ability to provide
circulators is at least as important a variable as the proneness of voters to
sign the petitions.
120. Betty H. Zisk argues that the effect of the number of propositions on the ballot on the
ability of voters to vote intelligently is often exaggerated. See B. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND
THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 162-65 (1987).
Assuming she is correct, this still should not diminish the right of the people of a state to
determine indirectly how many measures they will have to vote on by adjusting how hard or
easy it is to qualify a proposition for the ballot.
121. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
122. Illinois imposes a quota of no more than three initiatives per election, on a first come,
first served basis. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, para. 28-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). The quota
supplements, rather than replaces, the petition requirements.
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Let us suppose a state with a million voters eligible to sign petitions,
in which the signatures of five percent of these (50,000) are needed to
qualify an initiative for the ballot. Suppose that proposal A is supported
by fifty percent of the voters, while proposal B is supported by only
twenty-five percent. If the variable that determines which initiatives
qualify is support among the electorate, A should qualify in preference to
B. Nevertheless, if the supporters of B can provide enough circulators to
solicit at least 200,000 voters, whereas A's promoters are unable to solicit
at least 100,000 voters, B will qualify for the ballot and A will not.
123
Thus, even in an idealized world, our initiative qualification system
would be one that measures popular support for initiative proposals as
much by the ability of the supporters to circulate their proposal as by the
willingness of voters to sign it.
But we do not live in an idealized world.' 24 In the real world, most
people are unlikely even to have heard of an unqualified initiative propo-
sal, and if they have heard of one, they, may have no opinion about it.
The evidence considered in the previous section demonstrates that nu-
merous factors in addition to the content of the petition influences
whether an individual will sign when asked.
Now let us suppose that in a world more like the real one considered
in the previous section, proposal A addresses a popular subject-perhaps
it is a toxic control measure or a tax reduction proposal-and that fifty
percent of the voters will welcome an opportunity to sign once they are
informed of the general thrust of the proposal. Proposal B involves an
arcane issue that most voters either do not understand or care about-
perhaps it is a proposal to remove the trucking industry from the juris-
diction of the Public Utilities Commission-so that the number of voters
with an affirmative interest in signing is negligible. On the other hand,
let us suppose there is a substantial percentage of voters-let us conserva-
tively estimate 25 percent-who will sign a petition without regard to its
123. For simplicity's sake, we assume that support for the proposal is randomly distrib-
uted. Normally this would not be the case, so that by concentrating their efforts in areas where
potential signers are most concentrated, the proposal's supporters reduce the number of voters
who must be solicited. This does not affect our point and the assumption of randomness facili-
tates the exposition.
Also for simplicity's sake we ignore the fact that a significant amount of duplicate solicita-
tion will occur. This will increase the number of solicitations that will be necessary, and the
effect will be greater if the percentage of the population willing to sign is smaller. For this
reason, the ratio of solicitations needed for the less popular measure relative to the more popu-
lar measure may be greater than the figures in the text suggest. This still does not affect the
underlying point.
124. At least, those of us who live in Southern California do not.
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content 12- because they believe or are told that the measure should be
given a chance, or because it is the circulator's birthday, or because they
want to avoid getting into an argument with the circulator, or for some
other reason. If for purposes of simplicity we assume there is no overlap
between the supporters of A and the group that will sign anything, three
out of four voters will now sign petitions for A. Nevertheless, unless the
A proponents can field sufficient circulators to solicit 66,667 people, A
will not qualify. B, on the other hand, will still qualify if its proponents
can solicit 200,000 people, even though we are now assuming that B has
virtually no support at all.
These, we submit, are not unrealistic examples. What they show is
that support for the substance of a measure in the general population
simply is not measured by the number of signatures on a petition. All
else being equal, it helps that the proposal is popular. But all else is not
equal, and the significance of the popularity of the measure is minor rela-
tive to the significance of the number of people who can be solicited.
The result is that the true hurdle for qualifying measures for the
ballot is not having a proposal that people want to sign but inducing
enough people to go out and circulate the petitions. As Judge Holloway
and Justice Stevens emphasized in their opinions, circulation is hard
work, and it is not easy to induce people to do it-unless they are paid!
So long as circulation is by volunteers, the qualification requirement
does only an indifferent job of testing for breadth of support for a mea-
sure, but it does an excellent job of testing for depth, or intensity, of
support. Qualification of a measure by volunteer circulators demon-
strates that there is at least a cadre of individuals who care enough about
the proposal that they are willing to make a considerable sacrifice for
their cause. This is not an ideal result. The purposes of the initiative
suggest that what would be most desirable would be a set of qualification
requirements that tests for some combination of breadth and depth of
support. 126 The petition system carried out by volunteers does not do
125. We mean, of course, without regard to its content within reason. An interesting ex-
periment would be to see whether under realistic circumstances a substantial percentage of
voters can be induced to sign a petition in support of genocide, but nothing in our position
requires us to go to such extremes.
126. Cf. Sirico, The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOwA L. REV.
637, 661 (1980).
The petition requirement imposes a dual intensity check. Proponents must be so
dissatisfied that they commit themselves to a demanding campaign, and a sizeable
number of voters must be so dissatisfied that they contribute their signatures. Only
when a proposal provokes sufficient intensity on both fronts does the proponent gain
the opportunity to convince the voting majority to override the legislature.
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this perfectly because a relatively small group of fanatics may be able to
qualify proposals that probably would not earn ballot placement under a
system that could measure both breadth and depth of support. 127 Still,
the harm is tolerable because circulation by volunteers does measure
breadth to some degree 128 and because the election itself is a measure of
breadth of support.
Qualification of a measure by paid circulators stands in sharp con-
trast. If all circulators are paid, a measure may qualify even if no one
cares strongly about it. True, someone must care enough to put up the
money, but many businesses are large enough compared to the costs of
qualifying an initiative that the managers of the business could regard the
initiative as a cost-effective investment, even though it may be a relatively
minor matter to the company. Furthermore, if supporters can hire
enough circulators, then given what we know about why people sign peti-
tions, the measure can qualify, even though virtually no voters have any
affirmative desire to have it enacted into law.
It should be made clear that the voter has every right to sign an
initiative out of a belief that all proposals should be given a chance, or
because of sympathy with the circulator, or because of a reluctance to
turn down a stranger who asks a favor in a public place, or for any other
reason. The point is not that petition signers are doing anything blame-
worthy. The point is that in so acting, they create enough static that the
system cannot discern the message it was designed to receive, namely,
how many voters out there want this proposal to become law. Not neces-
sarily by design, the system adjusted itself, discerning a message that was
different but still good enough, namely, whether there are a number of
people who care enough about this proposal that they are willing to make
a substantial personal sacrifice in its behalf.
When the system began listening for this new message, the initiative
circulation industry arose to simulate the message. Those who serve in
that industry, and those who employ them, are not acting wrongly. They
127. The Lyndon LaRouche initiatives in California come to mind as examples.
128. Our examples show that if measures A and B each enjoyed enough intense support
that they could field volunteers to solicit 100,000 voters, the more popular measure, A, would
qualify, but B would not. Of course, the same could be said of professional circulation drives.
There undoubtedly is a range of spending, albeit a narrow range, within which a relatively
popular measure will qualify and a relatively unpopular one will not. The difference is that in
the case of a volunteer drive, both the proneness of voters to sign and the willingness of volun-
teers to circulate petitions are normatively relevant factors for the qualification of an initiative.
In the case of the professional drive, it is hard to see why the depth of the proponent's pocket is
relevant. Yet, our empirical research suggests that that is the only factor that ordinarily will
determine whether the proposal qualifies. The measure's relative popularity will affect only the
cost to the proponent.
are working according to the rules of the system to accomplish their le-
gitimate objectives. But by doing so they are rendering the system inca-
pable of filtering propositions for the ballot in a manner bearing any
resemblance to the purposes of the system. Colorado found a natural
and effective way of rehabilitating the system's ability to carry out its
purpose. Justice Stevens overthrew Colorado's reform, asserting in a sin-
gle sentence that the signatures themselves demonstrate sufficient sup-
port for the measure. Justice Stevens was wrong.
C. A Digression: Circulation by Mail
The argument in the previous section shows that Colorado's interest
in banning paid circulators was much stronger than Judge Holloway and
Justice Stevens recognized. What was at stake was the State's ability to
ration spaces on the ballot in a manner consistent with the purposes of
the initiative process, or, indeed, in a manner that makes any sense at all.
In the next Part we shall argue that our position also bears on the degree
to which the ban affects first amendment interests. Before proceeding to
our analysis of the First Amendment, we pause briefly to consider a com-
peting technique for soliciting signatures, the use of direct mail. Without
this discussion, our consideration of signature-collecting would be in-
complete. The reader whose interest is solely in our critique of Meyer v.
Grant (if any such readers are still with us) may proceed directly to Part
V. The reader whose primary interest is in the initiative qualification
process may wish to continue plodding along with us.
The emergence of direct mail as a primary means of circulating initi-
ative petitions is generally attributed to a California tax reduction initia-
tive sponsored by Howard Jarvis in 1979 and defeated on the 1980
ballot.129 Contemporary observers expected this technique to "mush-
room,"' 130 and one state official claimed it would be "crazy not to go the
computer-letter route. It's so easy." 131  What stimulated these predic-
tions was that the Jarvis tax initiative not only received over 800,000
signatures through the mail, but that the collection effort paid for itself
through contributions received with many of the signatures.
In fact, the use of direct mail as the primary means of circulation
129. See Fitzgerald, supra note 94, at 3; MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 64-65. Direct mail had
been used, at least as a supplementary means of signature collection, in earlier California ef-
forts, such as the Political Reform Act of 1974 for which Common Cause mailed out petitions
to its California membership. See K. Smith, supra note 110, n.8.
130. Fitzgerald, supra note 94, at 2.
131. Id (quoting Thomas Houston, then chairman of the Fair Political Practices
Commission).
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has not mushroomed, because it is not so easy after all.'32 Direct mail is
much more expensive than paid petition circulators. 13 3 Recipients are
not likely to sign and return the petitions, much less enclose contribu-
tions, unless, in the words of one commentator, the issue is "real
sexy."' 131 That direct mail has been used successfully only in particular
situations reflects the fact that whatever may be its other virtues, and
vices, direct mail is not vulnerable to the criticism we have levelled at
paid petition circulators in the previous sections, namely, that their use
permits qualification of measures that enjoy little or no public support.
A signature on a petition distributed by direct mail is likely to be
superior, as a measurement of substantive support, to a signature ob-
tained personally, whether the circulator is a professional or a volunteer.
Direct mail entails none of the social pressure or perceived need to avoid
an argument that may be implicit in personal solicitation. Whereas the
course of least resistance in a shopping mall may be to sign when asked,
signing and returning a petition by mail takes significantly more effort
than throwing away the solicitation letter. It is difficult to see how this
effort can be induced other than by persuasion that the petition is
meritorious.
In his recent text on the initiative process, Thomas E. Cronin135 lists
the following criticisms of direct mail as a signature-collecting device, to
which we add our comments.
L Direct Mail Subverts the Person-to-Person Participatory Process
The reader who has paid heed to our canvassing of the evidence
regarding the nature of that process may wish to respond, "Good rid-
dance." We add that, as Professor Cronin points out, a direct mail solici-
tation may prompt genuine conversations among family members and
neighbors regarding the merits of the proposition.' 36
132. In the numerous newspaper articles reporting discontent with the initiative qualifica-
tion process during the months preceding the 1988 general election in California, little or no
reference was made to the use of mail. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text. Direct
mail is not always cost-effective:
ETihere's a lot of waste with direct mail. Direct mail rarely works. It's gotten a lot
of press because Jarvis used it so well and Gann uses it. But for the most part it's
going to cost you a lot of money. You've got to be able to target your area so you can
pinpoint exactly who's going to sign your petition and who's not.
Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 20.
133. Id. at 20-21.
134. Interview with Joyce Koupal, at 6.
135. CRONIN, supra note 12, at 217.
136. Id. at 65.
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2. Direct Mail Turns Signature-Collection into a Business Rather than a
Volunteer Effort
This charge is a bit vague but may contain an element of truth. One
cannot criticise a process merely because some people profit from it.
Even a purely voluntary effort must pay a printer for the petitions and a
landlord for the signature drive's headquarters. It is hard to see why the
profit earned by either professional circulators and their managers or di-
rect mail consultants is more tainted.
What Professor Cronin may be getting at is the perception, and pos-
sibly the reality, that some of the direct mail drives of the early 1980s had
their origins in the profit motives of the direct mail firms rather than in
some interest or ideological group.137 Such a practice might be defended
on the ground that the entrepreneurial incentive enables a latent group to
overcome the structural obstacles to organization.13
Nevertheless, the prospect of initiative drives originating in a con-
sultant's office detached from participation by people genuinely con-
cerned with the issue at hand is disquieting. For one thing, the
consultant may have less incentive to take care in the drafting of the
proposition in its political, policy, and legal aspects than would a group
concerned primarily with the merits of the issue. However, experience to
date indicates that very few direct mail drives can generate a profit, so
that these concerns may be largely imaginary.
3. Direct Mail Appeals May Be Alarmist or Misleading
There is little reason to suppose that these problems are more likely
to be created by direct mail seeking to qualify an initiative than by direct
mail sent on behalf of candidates, to raise money for organizations, or for
other political purposes. To the extent the concern is with mail that is
alarmist, attempts to regulate this phenomenon would raise first amend-
ment concerns far more genuine than those that led to the decision in
Meyer v. Grant.
With respect to misleading mail, the major problem referred to by
Professor Cronin, or that we have seen raised elsewhere, is the sending of
letters designed to look like official mail or otherwise calculated to
deceive the recipient into opening it.139 This is not nice, but it is under-
137. There is no intrinsic reason why the generation of an initiative drive for reasons of
profit should be more likely to occur in the case of a direct mail consulting firm than in the
case of a petition management firm. However, to the best of our knowledge, the phenomenon
has not been associated with the latter type of firm in California.
138. See generally Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEsT J. POL.
Sci. 1 (1969).
139. CRONIN, supra note 12, at 64.
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standable given the proliferation of junk mail with which petition distrib-
utors must compete. The half life of such devices is short, as voters learn
to spot them. Even if this form of manipulation is regarded as unethical,
the consequence is only to get the recipient to open the envelope. Decep-
tion inside the envelope is more difficult because the objective is to obtain
a signature on the petition. The petition contains a prominent summary
of its contents, and because the signature process is complex, 1" the
signer must review it carefully, in contrast to the signer at a shopping
mall who can be instructed where to sign by the circulator.
4. Well-Funded Special Interests Have an Advantage over Groups with as
Much or More Support but Little or No Money
This is possibly the strongest argument against direct mail.
Although this concern is offset partially by the possibility that a cause
with very intense support will generate sufficient contributions to pay for
the mailings, experience suggests this will be a rare occurrence.
If cause A enjoys fairly widespread but lukewarm support, while
cause B enjoys more widespread and more enthusiastic support, but not
so enthusiastic that many supporters are willing to make contributions,
the purposes of the initiative dictate that cause B should qualify for the
ballot in preference to cause A. Nevertheless, if the proponent of A has a
deep pocket and the proponent of B does not, the availability of direct
mail is likely to result in A qualifying and B not qualifying.1 11
From the public's standpoint, the use of direct mail is superior to
the use of paid circulators in distributing initiative petitions. Something
relevant is measured, namely, the willingness of large numbers of individ-
uals to figure out how to complete the petition properly and return it.
Whether the use of volunteer circulators is superior to the use of direct
mail is more debatable. We have seen that in practice the use of volun-
teer circulators does a poor job of measuring breadth of support, but a.
good job of measuring depth. Nearly the opposite is the case with direct
mail. Except when the issue at stake is of such great concern that large
numbers of recipients are willing to send contributions with their signa-
tures, direct mail does an excellent job of measuring breadth of support
but does not measure depth at all. Direct mail may be criticized on egali-
tarian grounds because a proponent with deep pockets has an advantage.
But this advantage is less than exists with paid circulators because a de-
140. Considerable information must be given and the petition must be signed in two places,
once as signer'and once as circulator.
141. Another important variable for the feasibility of a direct mail signature-collection
drive would be how easily one could identify the supporters of the proposal.
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gree of public support is necessary.14.
Perceptions of whether controls should be placed on direct mail are
likely to be (and should be) affected by the extent and nature of its use.
Negative feelings were aroused in California because of the suddenness of
its appearance, the specific techniques and motives of its early users, and
opposition by most liberals to the causes for which it was employed.
Once it was discovered that direct mail was expensive and risky, the use
of direct mail-and opposition to it-diminished. Although there are no
signs of a resurgence, this is always possible, especially if new disincen-
tives to the use of paid circulators, such as those we propose in Part VI,
are adopted.143 In the event of a resurgence, the impulse for controls will
depend on whether and to what degree discernible abuses occur.
It may be objected that given Meyer v. Grant, any attempted control
on the use of direct mail would be unconstitutional. It is true that direct
controls would be likely to raise first amendment objections far stronger
than the spurious ones validated in Meyer. But indirect obstacles to the
use of direct mail, not easily susceptible to first amendment challenge, are
possible. An example would be a rule that each petition section must be
validated by a person other than one signing that section. Because of the
possibility of indirect controls, normative consideration of the use of di-
rect mail has continuing relevance, though our discussion suggests that it
offers no simple conclusions.
V. Paid Circulators and Free Speech
A. The "Involvement" of Speech with Circulation
Justice Stevens described two ways in which the ban on paid circula-
tors infringes upon freedom of speech. The first was that speech about
the measure is an inevitable attendant of circulation of an initiative
petition. 144
One might quibble with this assumption. People who already know
about the petition may sign without a word being exchanged with the
142. Another inegalitarian feature of direct mail is that if the group strongly supporting the
proposal consists of low-income individuals, the direct mail effort is likely to fail to generate
funds despite the presence of intense support. This form of inequality, although extremely
serious, infects every aspect of the system of money in politics. By itself, the use of direct mail
as a signature-gathering medium probably does not materially affect the relative political influ-
ence of the poor.
143. The use of direct mail as a supplementary means of circulating petitions, such as to
the members of proponent organizations, is likely to continue.
144. Justice Stevens' second argument, that the ban infringes speech by reducing the
number of initiatives that qualify for the ballot, is discussed infra notes 164-170 and accompa-
nying text.
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circulator. Ed Koupal's account of the technique of signature-gathering
is devoid of any substantive discussion of the measure.1 45 Furthermore, a
system of circulation divorced from advocacy is perfectly imaginable.
Judge Logan, dissenting in the Tenth Circuit, demonstrated this by sug-
gesting that rather than rely on private circulators, a state might require
that all initiative petitions be available for signature at public locations
throughout the community. 14 6 Supporters of the measure would use all
available means to encourage voters to sign, but the circulation would be
passive and neutral. Whatever might be said about the wisdom of such a
system, it is difficult to see how it could be thought to deny anyone the
freedom of speech.
Nevertheless, given a system resembling the one now in place in
states with the initiative, Justice Stevens is undoubtedly correct that a
degree of advocacy normally accompanies circulation of a proposal. Ap-
parently, then, it seemed natural, or perhaps inevitable, to categorize the
ban on paid circulators with Buckley v. Valeo's spending limits. Here, as
there, a limit is placed on spending for a speech-laden activity, and inevi-
tably the amount of speech is reduced.
This view is plausible only so long as one ignores the precise connec-
tions between the money, the speech, and the limit. Justice Stevens
fudged this point by using the vague expression that circulation of an
initiative necessarily "involves" political speech.14 7 In Buckley, the ac-
tivity being limited was spending on political campaigns. A political
campaign consists of almost nothing but speech, or intermediate tasks
whose ultimate purpose is the production of speech. A limit on spending
in a campaign was a limit on the necessary means by which speech is
accomplished, given Buckley's premise that spending money is a practi-
cal prerequisite for virtually all forms of effective campaigning. Effective
campaigning does not merely "involve" effective speech; effective
campaigning is identical to effective speech. What Buckley limited, then,
were the means for producing speech.
In Meyer, the case was quite different. The goal in Meyer was not
speech but signatures. Paying circulators is not a prerequisite to speech
about the initiative proposal or about anything else. Under the Colorado
law, nothing would have prevented the supporters of a proposition from
sending around one or more paid employees with every volunteer circu-
lator. The employees could have done all the arguing, so long as a volun-
145. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
146. Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1462 (10th Cir. 1987) (Logan, J., dissenting).
147. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1891.
teer was there to verify the signatures.' 4 8 Since the ban is directed to
paying the circulator, not to paying one or more advocates who might
accompany the circulator, there is no ban on paying for any lawful
means of persuasion the proponents may care to use. Justice Stevens
simply was wrong when he wrote that the ban limited "the number of
voices who [would] convey appellees' message and the hours they can
speak and, therefore,... the size of the audience they can reach."' 49 In
his zeal to make Meyer look like Buckley, he overlooked that there was
no speech activity that was prohibited by the Colorado law or that could
not be performed by paid personnel.
For the same reason, Stevens' recital of the principle that a speaker
may not be deprived of the most effective means of speech simply because
other means remain available was beside the point. Initiative proponents
in Colorado were not barred from any means of speech. Justice Stevens'
opinion confuses two senses of "effectiveness." Undoubtedly, paid cir-
culators were the plaintiffs' most effective means of gaining signatures,
but this is neither here nor there so far as the First Amendment is con-
cerned. The ban on paid circulators did not, as Justice Stevens asserted,
restrict the plaintiffs' access to "direct one-on-one communication." 150
The plaintiffs were free to spend as much as they liked to hire individuals
to go around communicating one-on-one.
Their ability to spend in this manner was not restricted, but their
incentive to do so was removed. This is an altogether different thing.
Many things done by the government reduce the incentive of persons to
speak. If the legislature, learning of the plaintiffs' planned initiative, had
148. The Colorado Attorney General argued to the Supreme Court that circulation of peti-
tions was a quasi-official function:
The prohibition against paying petition circulators is significant because it removes
the appearance of possible corruption from the only persons who validate the signa-
tures. The position is obviously governmental in nature. The verification of signa-
tures does not constitute speech, and the prohibition against payment of petition
circulators constitutes nothing more than the prohibition against payment for the act
of verifying signatures.
Brief for Appellants at 12, Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
This argument contained several weaknesses. Circulators have none of the characteristics
ordinarily associated with official actors. Most states have some process for checking the va-
lidity of all or a random selection of signatures after the petitions have been filed, and Colo-
rado's choice not to use any such process was a weak basis for treating the circulators as public
servants, especially at the cost of the circulators' speech rights.
We believe the state would have been on firmer ground if, instead of relying on the fiction
that circulators occupied a governmental position, it had pointed out that the validation func-
tion was separable from all speech activities, so that a ban on paying circulators did not entail a
ban on payment for any speech activity whatsoever.
149. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892.
150. Id. at 1893.
PAID INITIATIVE PETITION CIRCULATORS
Fall 19891
Fall 19891
212 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 17:175
acted on its own to deregulate the trucking industry, that would have
removed the plaintiffs' incentive to initiate debate on the subject far more
effectively than the ban on paid circulators. It would not have violated
the First Amendment.
Although paying circulators is not a prerequisite to speaking in any
sense, it might be a prerequisite to acquiring signatures, if volunteers can-
not be attracted. This does not present a question of freedom of speech,
however, especially when, in practice, the main reason for requiring sig-
natures as the means for qualifying initiatives is to see whether the mea-
sure can attract volunteer circulators.
The structure of Justice Stevens' argument is that when instrumen-
tal activity X is likely to entail speech activity Y, then restrictions on X
infringe upon first amendment rights. Y is not itself regulated, but under
the Stevens view, the fact that the activity (X) that in practice entails Y
has been restricted is sufficient. We need not claim that there are no
situations in which this analysis would be sound. We claim that it is not
always sound. For two reasons it is unsound in the case of the circula-
tion of initiative petitions.
First, if the First Amendment demands a policy of encouraging in-
strumental activities that entail speech, Meyer v. Grant pushes down the
rug in one place only to have it pop up in another, more important place.
Permitting the proponent of an initiative to hire circulators permits advo-
cacy in the shopping malls, however minimal we have seen that advocacy
to be, but in doing so it obviates the proponent's need to engage in an-
other, more meaningful form of advocacy, namely, the recruitment of
volunteers to circulate the petitions.' Contrast what we have seen of
the process of circulating petitions on the street with this account by an
individual with extensive experience in recruiting volunteer circulators:
[W]e were finding people who felt like they would get something
out of it, people who were committed to the environmnent for in-
stance or just to the idea of People's Lobby, that the initiative pro-
cess ... was an important way to let citizens express what they
wanted. They also participated in writing and drafting the initia-
tive that we were going to do, so that it was theirs. They were
brought into the entire process from the very beginning, what
would we do, how would we do it, drafting the law and then going
out and getting the signatures and participating in the campaign to
pass it. They were participating in the entire process.' 52
Striking down a restriction on instrumental activity in order to pre-
151. The Colorado statute placed no limitation on the proponent's ability to hire persons to
recruit volunteers.
152. Interview with Joyce Koupal, at 2.
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serve an incentive for political advocacy may be proper in some cases.' 53
But surely, in any such case, the preserved incentives for speech must
plainly outweigh any concomitant disincentives for speech. This condi-
tion is not satisfied in Meyer when the advocacy entailed in the recruit-
ment of volunteers is plainly superior as an instantiation of first
amendment values to the "hoopla," the rush that rules out more than a
couple of brief slogans, and the hawking of several unrelated petitions
simultaneously"5 4 that characterize paid signature gathering. The point
here is closely related to our argument in Part IV regarding the state's
interest in banning paid circulators.155 There, we saw that the ability to
recruit volunteer circulators, and not the ability of circulators to obtain
153. The charitable solicitation cases, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), which was cited by Justice Stevens in Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892
n.5, and Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), might be
regarded as examples. That is, the Court could have concluded that solicitation was an unpro-
tected activity, but that a ban on solicitation was unconstitutional because the ban would re-
move an incentive to engage in advocacy, which was protected by the First Amendment. In
Schaumburg, however, the Court rejected the state's formulation of the case along these lines.
The state argued that the ordinance at issue, which prohibited solicitation of contributions
unless at least 75% of the receipts were used for charitable purposes, was permissible, because
it "deals only with solicitation and because any charity is free to propagate its views from door
to door in the Village without a permit as long as it refrains from soliciting money." Schaum-
burg, 444 U.S. at 628. The Court rejected this characterization as representing "a far too
limited view" of prior cases regarding canvassing and soliciting by religious and charitable
groups. Id. Thus, rather than striking down the ordinance on the grounds that a ban on
solicitation would deter the advocacy that admittedly was not banned directly, the Court took
a more holistic view of the situation, regarding the ordinance as too much of a threat to organi-
zations whose activities traditionally had received special solicitude under the First Amend-
ment.
Despite the emphasis in Schaumburg, repeated in Munson, on the traditional protection
accorded to charities and religious groups, we recognize that these cases have a certain ana-
logic force in Meyer v. Grant, and we regard the reference to Schaumburg as the single most
persuasive argument Justice Stevens offers. Nevertheless, what decisively distinguishes
Schaumburg and Munson is that in those cases the state was prohibiting a consensual transac-
tion between private parties, whereas in Meyer the essential state activity was to determine how
it would allocate its own scarce ballot space. Because of this difference, the analogic force of
Schaumburg and Munson is at least offset by that emanating from Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
The Regan Court held that denial of a benefit tax subsidy, for engaging in activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment does not violate the Constitution, even when similar activity
engaged in by others is subsidized. Id. at 546. The award of a tax subsidy in Regan may be
analogized to the award of a ballot position in Meyer. That supporters of trucking deregula-
tion undoubtedly have a right to hire persons to obtain signatures on petitions expressing their
views does not obligate the state to submit their proposal to a vote any more than itobligates
the state to subsidize them financially.
154. See Interview with Mike Arno, at 15 (two or three petitions at once are most effective,
but he knew of one circulator carrying as many as eleven at a time); Interview with Kelly
Kimball, at 13 (in 1988, his circulators were carrying up to five petitions simultaneously).
155. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
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signatures, demonstrates in practice the requisite public support to earn a
ballot position for the proposal.156 Here we see, not coincidentally, that
it is at this crucial stage that meaningful political expression occurs.
Meyer v. Grant enshrines hucksterism at the expense of genuine political
dialogue. 157
The second reason that the First Amendment does not protect the
instrumental activity of circulation as an indirect means of encouraging
advocacy is that doing so consistently would lead to results that are
highly unlikely, if not absurd. Colorado's ban on paid circulators is but
one of numerous regulations of the process that exist in one, some, or all
of the states providing for the initiative."'8 Some regulations are routine,
and others are to varying degrees controversial, but the validity of many
of them would be in severe doubt in the unlikely event that the reasoning
of Meyer v. Grant were to be taken seriously. We shall consider briefly
three types of regulation, regarding who may circulate petitions, where
petitions may be circulated, and the permissible content of petitions.
Most states restrict the circulation of initiative petitions to either
registered voters or persons eligible for voter registration. 159 This means,
depending on the election laws of the particular state, that persons under
eighteen, aliens, nonresidents, residents who have moved into the state
within thirty days, formerly convicted felons, and others are ineligible to
circulate petitions. Yet, all these people have first amendment rights.
None could be prohibited from advocating statutory or constitutional
changes. Circulation by a member of one of these groups would "in-
volve" advocacy to the same degree as circulation by a registered voter.
If saying that one individual may not be paid to circulate a petition in-
fringes freedom of speech, saying that another individual may not circu-
late a petition at all must violate the First Amendment even more."
156. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
157. Those who believe the cardinal principle of first amendment jurisprudence is content
neutrality may object to the characterization of one form of speech as superior to another.
Nevertheless, such individuals should agree with our basic position. If a regulation that does
not restrict speech directly (ban on paid circulators) is challenged on grounds that it discour-
ages some speech indirectly (speech by initiative proponents who are unable to attract volun-
teer circulators to accompany paid advocates), the showing that the regulation also encourages
speech that otherwise would be discouraged (recruitment of volunteers) should suffice for the
content neutrality adherent. That person has no basis for favoring the speech discouraged by
the regulation over that which is encouraged.
158. See infra notes 159-169 and accompanying text.
159. See, eg., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 42 (West. Supp. 1989).
160. If restrictions on who may circulate petitions were said to infringe first amendment
rights, the state might try to justify restrictions on the basis of the need for a reliable person to
verify signatures. However, there is no basis for saying that an eligible voter is more reliable
than a nonvoter. Aliens, for example, or persons who have moved to a state within 30 days are
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In about half the states providing for the initiative, a degree of geo-
graphic distribution of signatures is required for qualification of a mea-
sure. 6 ' In Massachusetts, for example, no more than 25 percent of the
signatures may come from a single county.'6 2 This means that if a pro-
ponent has already obtained 25 percent of the total required from, say,
Boston, no more circulation in Boston will count toward the qualification
effort. It would be difficult to justify placing a cap on the amount of
speech in particular counties as a time, place, or manner restriction.
Therefore, if restrictions on the circulation of initiative petitions infringe
upon freedom of speech, such geographic restrictions would be difficult
to defend against a first amendment attack. 163
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court has
often expressed the view that the most suspect form of infringement of
free speech rights is one that regulates content. 64 Yet, numerous and
diverse provisions regulate the content of initiatives. 65 In some states,
for example, initiatives may embrace only a single subject.' 6 6 In several
states, initiative statutes are permitted but not initiative constitutional
amendments, 167 meaning a proposal contravening the state constitution
may not be circulated. In Illinois, only initiatives affecting the legislature
not less reliable as a group than registered voters. There is some convenience to election offi-
cials, who have signatures of registered voters on file, in limiting the circulators to that group.
Administrative convenience, however, is not usually enough to justify what is, by hypothesis, a
significant restriction of speech rights. More fundamentally, the "verification" function served
by the circulator provides little benefit, especially in the great majority of states that check
signatures after the petitions are filed. The only serious justification for restricting petition-
circulation to registered or eligible voters is that the ability to recruit circulators is the measure
of voter support. This is precisely the justification for a ban on paid circulators.
161. CRONIN, supra note 12, at 235-36. A breakdown of the requirements in individual
states is found in Magleby, supra note 110, at 294-95.
162. Id.
163. Presumably, the state's defense would be that it chose to require a certain form of
voter support, including not only an absolute number but a certain distribution as well. It is
hard to see why this argument should be stronger than a state's claim that it wishes to require
support to be manifested by the ability to recruit volunteer circulators. To the contrary, the
defense of the geographic distribution requirement is suspect to the extent it treats voters dif-
ferently according to their place of residence. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). For a challenge to geographic distribution requirements prior to the ruling in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), to the effect that malapportionment controversies were justiciable,
see South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
164. For a recent discussion containing references to the extensive case law and secondary
literature, see Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1904 (1989).
165. See Magleby, supra note 110, at 289-90.
166. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(d). See generally Lowenstein, California Initiatives and
the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983).
167. See B. ZISK, supra note 120, at 15.
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are permitted.168 These and similar restrictions would be in the greatest
jeopardy of all if Justice Stevens' reasoning were followed because, unlike
the ban on paid circulators and each of the previous examples, these re-
strictions are not content-neutral. 169
We do not think the Supreme Court would strike down these or
many similar regulations of the initiative qualification process as violative
of the freedom of speech.17 We doubt that first amendment challenges
to most of them would be taken seriously, despite the fact that under
Meyer v. Grant all of them should be highly vulnerable. If we are right in
these suppositions, why did the first amendment attack on the ban on
paid circulators succeed? We can think of two possible explanations,
neither of which serves as a justification.
The first relates to the form of the ban as a criminal prohibition.
State statutes typically do not make it a crime, absent fraud, for a non-
voter to circulate a petition, for the proponent to go on circulating in
counties where the geographic distributional quota already has been sat-
isfied, or for the proponent to circulate a petition that is ineligible by
reason of containing too many subjects or for some comparable reason.
Signatures so gathered or petitions so circulated simply are rejected by
state election officials. The form of the Colorado ban, as a criminal pro-
hibition, made it look more like the kind of law that raises first amend-
ment questions. However, as we demonstrated with our hypothetical
statute in Part 11,171 the criminal prohibition form is not essential to the
ban, since the same effect could have been achieved by a statute taking a
form similar to the examples discussed in this section, namely instructing
state officials to ignore the product rather than criminalizing the con-
duct. First amendment analysis should not turn on such differences of
form.
The second explanation relates to the analogy drawn from Buckley
168. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
169. The example of the states permitting statutory but not constitutional initiatives shows
that these restrictions need not even be viewpoint neutral. Suppose the constitution of such a
state mandated regulation of trucking but left most of the particulars of regulation open to
legislation. In that state, an initiative to deregulate trucking would be barred, whereas an
initiative to make regulation of trucking more onerous would be permissible.
170. This is not to deny that some procedures might be unconstitutional. For example, in
Massachusetts, the attorney general may reject proposals he or she deems beyond the scope of
the initiative process. B. ZISK, supra note 120, at 259-60. The vesting of content-based power
to block access to an established legislative process in a nonjudicial official raises serious first
amendment questions in the absence of procedural safeguards analogous to those required in
the case of content-based prior restraints on literature and other forms of expression. See
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 50 (1965).
171. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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v. Valeo. 172 We have seen that in more than one place the very wording
of Justice Stevens' opinion in Meyer v. Grant seemed to be shaped by the
rhetorical force of Buckley.'73 Some lawyers, and some Supreme Court
Justices too, may think that Buckley and some of the subsequent cam-
paign finance cases 74 established a privileged status within the First
Amendment for political expenditures. In this view, the ability to show
that a challenged regulation affects campaign expenditures creates a par-
ticularly strong, perhaps irresistible, first amendment attack.
Surely this is wrong. Buckley was a landmark case in part because it
held that speech requiring the expenditure of money does not receive a
reduced level of constitutional protection. This holding remains contro-
versial enough,' but it would be perverse to convert it into the alto-
gether different doctrine that one who pays for speech receives greater
protection than one who speaks without spending money. It follows that
the proponent who is restricted from spending money to hire petition
circulators is entitled to precisely the same degree of first amendment
protection as the proponent who is restricted from recruiting circulators
who are not eligible to vote, the proponent who is restricted from contin-
uing to circulate petitions in a county that has already surpassed its geo-
graphic quota, and the proponent who in Illinois is restricted from
circulating an initiative not affecting the legislature. None.
B. The Difficulty of Qualification
Justice Stevens' second explanation for why the ban on paid circula-
tors invades freedom of speech was that by making it more difficult to
qualify initiatives, proponents' ability to focus discussion on their propos-
als would be limited.176 This is a remarkably weak argument, and it is
doubtful whether it would have been offered if the question had not been
confused by Judge Logan's faulty reliance on Posadas.177 The obvious
objection to Justice Stevens' point is that the state is not required to have
an initiative process at all. It is difficult to see why Colorado denies its
citizens freedom of speech when it enacts a statute that increases the
172. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
173. See supra notes 62, 147-149 and accompanying text.
174. Particularly, in matters involving ballot measures, see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), and Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981).
175. See, eg., Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976); Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
176. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892.
177. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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difficulty of qualifying an initiative, when New York is permitted to deny
its citizens any access to the ballot.
Justice Stevens' answer, unfortunately blurred by the fact that it
comes in the context of Posadas, is that "the power to ban initiatives
[does not] entirely includ[e] the power to limit discussion of political is-
sues raised in initiative petitions." 178 Undoubtedly, a state could restrict
access to the initiative process in many ways that would violate the First
Amendment or related constitutional guarantees. Obvious examples
would be statutes that said only members of the Democratic or Republi-
can parties could circulate initiatives; no one could debate publicly the
merits of an initiative proposal while it is in circulation; or no one in the
course of circulating an initiative could criticize a government official.
But the mere fact that it is possible to regulate access to the initiative
ballot (and almost any other subject) in ways that would offend the Con-
stitution does not mean that the states do not enjoy a general ability to
set reasonable requirements to decide which initiatives will qualify for
the ballot. It is hard to see what is unreasonable about a qualification
standard that calls for volunteers to acquire a specified number of signa-
tures. The constitutional defect in the examples in the previous para-
graph is not simply that they make it more difficult to qualify an
initiative. Otherwise, a mere increase in the required number of signa-
tures would violate the First Amendment.
There is another, equally important respect in which Justice Ste-
vens' argument is wrong. In making the argument he was confronted
with the embarrassing fact that Colorado has one of the heaviest rates of
use of the initiative in the United States.1 79 The district court had found
that more initiatives qualified in Colorado than in the great majority of
states that permit the use of paid circulators.18 Justice Stevens' only
response to this point was to note that without the ban, even more pro-
positions would qualify. 181
This response overlooks the fact that the purpose of initiative quali-
fication requirements is not to qualify the largest possible number of
measures for the ballot.1 82 That objective could be accomplished easily
178. Meyer, 108 S. Ct at 1893 (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1456 (10th Cir.
1987)).
179. See Magleby, supra note 110, at 292 (table shows 45 measures qualified in Colorado
between 1950 and 1984, for a ranking of sixth out of 26 states, and nearly doubling the median
figure of 23 measures qualifying during the same period).
180. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1890 n.3.
181. Id.
182. The same point of confusion has occurred in lower court decisions. In Hardie v. Eu,
18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1976) (en banc), cerL denied. 430 U.S. 969
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by permitting any individual to propose as many measures for the ballot
as he or she likes.
The real objective of the qualification requirements is to filter out all
proposals but a reasonable number that have made the greatest showing
of popular support. If, as a result of the Supreme Court abolishing the
ban on paid circulators, the voters of Colorado find there are more meas-
ures qualifying than they reasonably can consider, they will demand that
the legislature make the requirements more severe. The legislature un-
doubtedly will respond. It may shorten the time within which signatures
may be gathered; or it may increase the number of signatures; or it may
simply leave the signature-percentage unchanged, silently letting the
qualification requirements become more difficult as the population
grows. In the long term, the result will not be more initiatives. The
result will be more initiative places on the ballot bought and paid for, and
fewer earned by the hard work of volunteers.18 Recent experience in
California has shown precisely this course of development and an en-
tirely appropriate adverse public reaction.184 Meyer v. Grant, by barring
the most straightforward remedy, is a blow against participatory democ-
racy. It does nothing for free speech.
VI. A Proposal: The Volunteer Bonus
As we have seen, Meyer v. Grant comes at a time of growing dis-
enchantment with the capture of the initiative qualification process by
those who can afford to pay huge sums to initiative circulators. If the
initiative is to continue to perform its historic function, reforms must be
(1976) (striking down a statutory limit on spending for professional circulators), the California
Supreme Court declared that it could not "assume that any proposal capable of generating
genuine voter support will necessarily attract at the outset sufficient 'volunteer' circulators to
do the job." Id. at 377, 556 P.2d at 304, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 204. This comment was repeated in
Ficker v. Montgomery Bd. of Elections, 670 F. Supp. 618, 620 (D. Md. 1985), a case correctly
anticipating the result in Meyer v. Grant. Both these courts erroneously assumed that all pro-
posals "capable of generating genuine voter support" are entitled to places on the ballot. If
"genuine voter support" is defined as approval by a majority in an election, the number of
measures with the potential to generate such support presumably is vast. If the support re-
ferred to is merely the willingness of the requisite number of voters to sign a petition if asked,
our findings regarding the signature-gathering process suggest that the number of measures
having the ability to generate this kind of support is virtually infinite. These lower courts and
the Supreme Court all failed to recognize that the purpose of the qualification requirements is
not to place on the ballot all measures that voters may be willing to support, but instead to
winnow out all measures except those evidencing unusual affirmative voter demand.
183. This result is especially likely in a state such as Illinois that imposes a quota on the
number of initiative measures that may appear on the ballot in one election. See supra note
122. A volunteer group might qualify an initiative, only to find that three other groups, oper-
ating through hired circulators, had previously qualified their measures.
184. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
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designed to restore the initiative process to the volunteers. Meyer v.
Grant makes that harder, but not necessarily impossible.
One proposal for reform that is likely to receive discussion is a re-
quirement that professional circulators disclose to signers that they are
being paid.185 Such a requirement may be defensible on the simple
ground that it is better for the solicitee to be provided with information
than to be denied it. It is illusory, however, to imagine that a disclosure
requirement would provide an effective response to the serious problems
posed by professional circulators. For one thing, a disclosure require-
ment probably would not make it more difficult for paid circulators to
succeed. Those in the industry do not think it would have this effect. 8 6
To the contrary, there is every reason to believe circulators, like door-to-
door magazine salespersons, would be able to use the disclosure require-
ment to their advantage: "Please sign this petition and help me go to
college!" This seems to us at least as good a reason for signing as the
desire to give the circulator a birthday greeting. More fundamentally,
the disclosure might add to and certainly would not detract from the
degree to which the signatures obtained reflect considerations unrelated
to popular support for the proposal.18 7
Genuine reform must start with the recognition that it can be both
too hard and too easy to qualify an initiative. This is the case now in
California, and it will be the case elsewhere if, as seems very likely, the
petition management industry that has grown up in California spreads
rapidly to other states.188 It is now the case in California that almost no
initiatives qualify primarily with signatures obtained by volunteers. This
was not always the case. Many initiatives as recently as the 1970s quali-
fied solely or predominantly with volunteer circulators."8 9 On the other
185. Cal. A.B. 141, Speir.
186. Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 17.
187. A related difficulty with the disclosure requirement is that in order to make it enforce-
able, proposals are likely to require that the disclosure appear conspicuously on the face of any
petition section circulated professionally. This can only detract from the existing and far more
important requirement that summary information about the content of the measure appear
conspicuously. The proposal we offer below would require disclosure, but for reasons that do
not make it crucial that the disclosure occur before the individual signs. Accordingly, the
disclosure could take the form of a separate card that a professional circulator must hand to
each person who signs.
188. One of the two major California firms managed the first paid petition drive in Colo-
rado after Meyer v. Grant. Interview with Mike Arno, at I. Kelly Kimball, whose firm has
qualified initiatives in a number of states besides California, predicted growth in the utilization
of the process outside of California. Interview with Kelly Kimball, at 3. He added that "Flor-
ida's in its infancy in its initiative process. It's about to explode." Id. at 25.
189. See Price, supra note 112, at 357 (examples of three measures that qualified in the late
1970s using only volunteer circulators).
PAID INITIATIVE PETITION CIRCULATORS
hand, for those willing and able to pay, qualification is too easy. The
initiative circulation industry can assure qualification, more or less with-
out regard to the content of the proposal.
If it were not for Meyer v. Grant, a statute setting aside signatures
obtained by professionals (along the lines of our hypothetical statute)
would solve the second part of the problem. But the Court has decided
Meyer and is not likely to stand for a disguised version of the Colorado
statute. In any event, a ban on paid circulators would do nothing to ease
access to the ballot for volunteer groups.
We propose that the number of signatures required for qualification
be increased. This would respond to the growing feeling among the elec-
torate that too many groups, and especially too many special interest
groups, are buying their way onto the ballot. For the response to be
effective, the increase in the requirement should be large enough so that
it will be difficult or impossible to qualify a measure primarily with paid
circulators. Given the efficiency of the petition management industry, a
very substantial increase would be needed, perhaps a doubling or tripling
of the requirement in California. As a starting point for discussion, we
propose an increase of 150 percent.190
Our proposal to this point addresses the problem of qualification
that is too easy, but not the problem of its being too hard. An increase in
the signature requirement without more would have nearly the same
practical effect as repealing the initiative altogether, which is not at all
our intent. Therefore, we propose a two-tier signature requirement. Sig-
natures obtained by volunteers and those obtained by paid circulators
would both count, but there would be a bonus for the former. Again, as
a starting point for discussion and assuming a 150 percent increase in the
basic signature requirement, we propose that each signature from a vol-
unteer would count as five. In that case, a petition drive relying exclu-
sively on volunteers would need half as many signatures as at present
after taking into account the volunteer bonus.
To avoid unfairness to individuals who sign a petition section circu-
lated by professionals, in our proposal such individuals would remain
free to sign a section of the same petition circulated by a volunteer.
When an individual is found to have signed both professional and volun-
teer sections, the signature eligible for the bonus would be the one
190. We would also favor stating the requirements in absolute figures rather than as a
percentage of the electorate. Because the real challenge is the mobilization of circulators and
not the actual obtaining of signatures, the ease of obtaining signatures does not grow propor-
tionately with growth in the population of the state. This is not to deny that some adjustments
are desirable from time to time, but the adjustments should be made by constitutional amend-
ments that can be debated, rather than as an automatic by-product of population growth.
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counted. The professional circulator would be required to disclose these
circumstances to the signer.191
Our proposal would stimulate use of the initiative by popularly
based groups, who have tended to be frozen out in recent years. It would
not prohibit the use of the initiative by groups relying solely on paid
circulators, but it would give them a significant incentive to switch, at
least in part, to volunteers. It would not be a perfect system, but neither
is the present system, with or without the now unconstitutional Colorado
ban.
Under our proposal, a circulator might falsely declare that he or she
is a volunteer, thus obtaining the volunteer bonus under false pre-
tenses. 192 Such deception, however, would not defeat the purposes of our
proposal unless it occurred on a large scale. This would be difficult to
conceal because the finances of an initiative qualification effort must be
reported to the public, and are subject to audit.' 93 We conclude that our
proposal is enforceable.
Finally, we believe our plan is constitutional. It does not make pay-
ment for circulation a crime, nor does it render such payment futile. It
does not prohibit anything. In Meyer v. Grant, Justice Stevens relied in
part on testimony describing the sacrifices volunteers may be required to
make, causing proponents to desire to turn to paid circulators. 194 In this
sense, our proposal to recognize the sacrifices of volunteers by rewarding
them with a signature bonus finds support in the Supreme Court's opin-
ion. To put the point within the framework we have established in this
article, we may say that by awarding the bonus, our proposal improves
the state's measuring device by placing extra weight on what is most
likely to reflect genuine public sentiment. In doing so, our proposal
would greatly stimulate the one portion of the initiative qualification pro-
cess that furthers first amendment values in a meaningful way, namely,
the recruitment of volunteer circulators.
We do not deny that Meyer provides a toe hold for persons challeng-
ing our system. Nevertheless, we are hard-pressed to see how their argu-
ment would proceed, unless the Supreme Court is willing to say that the
First Amendment hands over the ballot to the highest bidder. Presuma-
bly, the argument would be cast in terms of a "burden" being placed on
the "right" to pay circulators. But it is no burden on one who pays cir-
191. See supra notes 65, 187.
192. Such violations could be minimized by requiring proponents to file a list of all paid
circulators.
193. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84200.5(f) (West Supp. 1989) (reporting requirements);
§ 90001(h) (West 1987) (audits).
194. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1892 n.6.
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culators that a bonus is given to proponents of other proposals in return
for what Justice Stevens recognized was the difficult task of recruiting
volunteers to circulate petitions.195 The right recognized in Meyer was
the right to pay circulators not to a guarantee that paid circulators' work
product must be weighted identically with that of volunteers.
Our proposal might be challenged as a denial of equal protection.
The unequal weighting of signatures might be analogized to unequal
weighting of votes, which is not permitted under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 196 But a signature on a petition is not like a vote, for purposes of
evaluating "weighting." Votes are competitive, either among candidates
or among positions (yes or no) on propositions. Increasing the "weight"
of A's vote harms B, who may take a position opposed to A 's. In con-
trast, petition signing is additive. If B signs a petition section circulated
by a professional circulator in the hope of qualifying a measure for the
ballot, B's goals are furthered, not hindered, ifA's signature for the same
measure on a section circulated by a volunteer is multiplied. Further-
more, B retains the option of signing a volunteer section and thereby
multiplying the effect of B's own signature.
If an equal protection challenge is brought by a proponent who re-
lies predominantly on paid circulators, the response would be that the
proponent has the same right as others to recruit volunteer circulators.
Furthermore, this Article has demonstrated that the volunteer bonus is
supported by the compelling state interest of rationing ballot positions on
a basis other than the depth of the proponent's pocket.
The main drawback of our proposal is neither one of policy nor of
constitutionality, but of politics. The volunteer bonus makes the process
somewhat more complex than it has been, and even may appear gim-
micky at first hearing. The Colorado ban was much more straightfor-
ward, and in that sense it was preferable. The volunteer bonus system, at
the cost of greater complexity, introduces an element of flexibility that
may be desirable. At any rate, the straightforward approach is ruled out
for now. Those interested in the well-being of our processes of direct
democracy will need to be open to innovative approaches, whether to
ours or to others that may be put forward. The warning signal that was
fired in California's last election will be ignored at great peril.
195. See id.
196. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Conclusion
Meyer v. Grant seemed like an easy case to the Supreme Court. Jus-
tice Stevens, known for his creativity, was content to follow in the tracks
of Judge Holloway in the court below. He ignored telling points made in
response to Judge Holloway by Judge Logan. Justices who, based on
their previous actions, ought to have dissented (Justice White in particu-
lar),197 joined in Justice Stevens' opinion.
The apparent reason the Court thought that this was an easy case
was that it seemed to fit neatly within the doctrinal pattern set by Buck-
ley and the other campaign finance decisions. But the Supreme Court
should not issue decisions when it is unwilling or unable to devote the
time to a careful and sensitive consideration of the case, in all its specific-
ity. The Court's preoccupation with doctrine distracts it from its greatest
task as a court, which is not the elaboration of rules but the wise determi-
nation of individual disputes. The best judicial rules are the ones that
emerge from such adjudication, not the ones that are imposed on and get
in the way of adjudication.
So, in Meyer v. Grant, if the Court had been willing to take even a
second look, it would have noticed that this was not a campaign finance
case; that there was no prohibition of any speech activity, paid or other-
wise; that any state that employs the initiative process must employ some
means of drastically restricting the number of proposals that can appear
on the ballot; and that by exalting one type of initiative user, the Court
was interfering with the ability of the states to ease access to the ballot
for other groups. Carelessly, the Court impaired the states' ability to
reform the initiative process. Perhaps, as we have suggested, the damage
can be controlled.
197. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, (White, J., dissenting in part); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, (White, J., dissenting); Citizens Against Rent Control v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, (White, J., dissenting).
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